4 ms·
Discussed here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16082909 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16082909 cperciva's paper from 2005 (linked above): http:/
by gregsadetsky 5y ago
Discussed here:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16082909 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16082909
cperciva's paper from 2005 (linked above):
http://www.daemonology.net/papers/htt.pdf http://www.daemonology.net/papers/htt.pdf
- sillysaurusx 5y agoHmm. That commenter’s username seems familiar… Thanks. :) > The problems introduced by caches have been further exacerbated by the current trend towards increased parallelism. On recent processors implementing simultaneous multithreading [18], such as Intel’s “Hyper- Threading” processors [11], access to the L1 cache is shared between two independent instruction streams And here we are 16 years later, with NO_SMT. Neat. Perhaps my emotional outburst wasn’t substantive, but boy was it satisfying. I’ll try to restrain such urges in the future, but somehow I doubt a 16 year “told ya so” will pop up again any time soon. It’s half as old as I am. I wish I could remember Linus’ remark about cperciva’s attack being merely “theoretical.”
- gregsadetsky 5y agohttps://lkml.org/lkml/2005/5/16/152 https://lkml.org/lkml/2005/5/16/152 Linus: "[...] I'd be really surprised if somebody is actually able to get a real-world attack on a real-world pgp key usage or similar out of it (and as to the covert channel, nobody cares). It's a fairly interesting approach, but it's certainly neither new nor HT-specific, or necessarily seem all that worrying in real life. [...]"