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> I don't know why you are talking about suffering. I was not talking about suffering. I have no idea where you are going with that. I brought this up because

> I don't know why you are talking about suffering. I was not talking about suffering. I have no idea where you are going with that. I brought this up because the EA community seems very closely associated with rationalist ideas. Although I'm sure there are other rationalist conceptions of "the good" out there, I've yet to see them clearly articulated. > ...emotions... Perhaps the word I should have used is "desire", as emotion springs from desire, and although specific emotional states are easily observable, the underlying desire is what often remains hidden, subject to the other's fantasies. But it's an aside at this point. > That's rather why it's called "Less Wrong" rather than "Objectively Right". I'm glad you brought this up, because it raises what I see as the key question, the crux of the matter: "Less Wrong" relative to whom? And for what end?

FeepingCreature 5y ago
> I brought this up because the EA community seems very closely associated with rationalist ideas. Although I'm sure there are other rationalist conceptions of "the good" out there, I've yet to see them clearly articulated. The EA community aren't even unified in minimizing suffering. Most of the formulations I've seen are about maximizing good life, though there are certainly people who care about suffering in the community. (I think it's mostly Tomasik.) I haven't seen any of them try to justify their preferences with evpsych though. > I'm glad you brought this up, because it raises what I see as the key question, the crux of the matter: "Less Wrong" relative to whom? And for what end? Once more: Less Wrong relative to a presumed-ordered natural world. To the end of shaping this world to be more in line with one's preferences.
- Nav_Panel 5y ago
  > Less Wrong relative to a presumed-ordered natural world The "natural world" doesn't have beliefs, the world itself cannot be right or wrong, it just is. So the question again is, Less Wrong relative to whom? > To the end of shaping this world to be more in line with one's preferences. And what if one is unsure of one's preferences?
  - FeepingCreature 5y ago
    > The "natural world" doesn't have beliefs, the world itself cannot be right or wrong, it just is. So the question again is, Less Wrong relative to whom? What? Okay, let me try really small steps. We assume the natural world is ordered. We assume that the brain holds beliefs, which are compressive/predictive patterns, about the observations of the natural world. Inasmuch as these are predictive, and inasmuch as we can take multiple actions, then a belief can be qualitatively better or worse in selecting actions that make the world be more good by one's judgment. Beliefs can fail to be appropriate to select actions on (at least) two metrics: they can be "right or wrong", or they can be "more or less useful." An example of a wrong belief: if you think it is raining, and so you bring an umbrella, but it is not raining (the belief is wrong), then you have failed to improve your position: you are dry anyway, but now you are also carrying an umbrella, which is annoying. An example of a useless belief: you can believe that your shirt has more fibers than the average shirt of its kind. This may be true, but even if it is true, there is no decision that you would make where the belief is instrumental in deciding which of the possible actions leads to a world that better matches your preference. (Unless you have very specific preferences about clothing.) The goal of becoming Less Wrong is for your brain to contain fewer beliefs that are wrong, and more beliefs that are right; and also (but less importantly) fewer beliefs that are useless, and more beliefs that are useful. The term "Less Wrong" does not refer to a comparison to some other existing human, but rather to the counterfactual outcome of failing to reflect on your thoughts - Less Wrong is a collection of techniques whose goal is, when applied, to make your brain have less wrong beliefs and less useless beliefs, in order to improve your ability to shape the world to your preferences. (Whether they actually achieve this is a hot topic of debate - but that is the standard which they set.) > And what if one is unsure of one's preferences? That depends on your preferences for your preferences. :) In any case, setting your preferences is not the purpose of rationality. (Though as your preferences are part of the ordered natural world, rationality also aims to improve your ability to shape your preferences, this does not tend to be a central consideration.)
    - Nav_Panel 5y ago
      So, to be perfectly clear, the main reason for studying rationality as you explain it, is the belief that many individuals are not skilled at determining whether their beliefs about the observable world are right or wrong (as in your umbrella example), and that this is something they would benefit from working on?

FeepingCreature 5y ago

> I brought this up because the EA community seems very closely associated with rationalist ideas. Although I'm sure there are other rationalist conceptions of "the good" out there, I've yet to see them clearly articulated. The EA community aren't even unified in minimizing suffering. Most of the formulations I've seen are about maximizing good life, though there are certainly people who care about suffering in the community. (I think it's mostly Tomasik.) I haven't seen any of them try to justify their preferences with evpsych though. > I'm glad you brought this up, because it raises what I see as the key question, the crux of the matter: "Less Wrong" relative to whom? And for what end? Once more: Less Wrong relative to a presumed-ordered natural world. To the end of shaping this world to be more in line with one's preferences.

Nav_Panel 5y ago
> Less Wrong relative to a presumed-ordered natural world The "natural world" doesn't have beliefs, the world itself cannot be right or wrong, it just is. So the question again is, Less Wrong relative to whom? > To the end of shaping this world to be more in line with one's preferences. And what if one is unsure of one's preferences?
- FeepingCreature 5y ago
  > The "natural world" doesn't have beliefs, the world itself cannot be right or wrong, it just is. So the question again is, Less Wrong relative to whom? What? Okay, let me try really small steps. We assume the natural world is ordered. We assume that the brain holds beliefs, which are compressive/predictive patterns, about the observations of the natural world. Inasmuch as these are predictive, and inasmuch as we can take multiple actions, then a belief can be qualitatively better or worse in selecting actions that make the world be more good by one's judgment. Beliefs can fail to be appropriate to select actions on (at least) two metrics: they can be "right or wrong", or they can be "more or less useful." An example of a wrong belief: if you think it is raining, and so you bring an umbrella, but it is not raining (the belief is wrong), then you have failed to improve your position: you are dry anyway, but now you are also carrying an umbrella, which is annoying. An example of a useless belief: you can believe that your shirt has more fibers than the average shirt of its kind. This may be true, but even if it is true, there is no decision that you would make where the belief is instrumental in deciding which of the possible actions leads to a world that better matches your preference. (Unless you have very specific preferences about clothing.) The goal of becoming Less Wrong is for your brain to contain fewer beliefs that are wrong, and more beliefs that are right; and also (but less importantly) fewer beliefs that are useless, and more beliefs that are useful. The term "Less Wrong" does not refer to a comparison to some other existing human, but rather to the counterfactual outcome of failing to reflect on your thoughts - Less Wrong is a collection of techniques whose goal is, when applied, to make your brain have less wrong beliefs and less useless beliefs, in order to improve your ability to shape the world to your preferences. (Whether they actually achieve this is a hot topic of debate - but that is the standard which they set.) > And what if one is unsure of one's preferences? That depends on your preferences for your preferences. :) In any case, setting your preferences is not the purpose of rationality. (Though as your preferences are part of the ordered natural world, rationality also aims to improve your ability to shape your preferences, this does not tend to be a central consideration.)
  - Nav_Panel 5y ago
    So, to be perfectly clear, the main reason for studying rationality as you explain it, is the belief that many individuals are not skilled at determining whether their beliefs about the observable world are right or wrong (as in your umbrella example), and that this is something they would benefit from working on?