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In order to say things like "my brain" one is necessarily creating a distinction between themselves as thinking subject and a "lower self" which consists of a b

In order to say things like "my brain" one is necessarily creating a distinction between themselves as thinking subject and a "lower self" which consists of a biological substrate. Of course, this is common practice in folk epistemology, but in order to achieve this, one needs the support of an "objective" frame of reference, which can only be achieved through a theological justification (or in this case cosmological, through reference to evolutionary processes). This was an issue that Kant grappled with, in that the mind cannot distance itself from itself. When we "understand the game theoretic strategy that our brain is executing", we are still implicated in other "game theoretic strategies", we've just made certain ones manifest and chosen to ignore others. That said, I still support the end-goal of "bringing emotions into harmony with our conscious beliefs", but often that requires turning in the opposite direction: asking questions to the emotions themselves rather than to the world, which requires an entirely different conceptual toolkit (e.g. psychoanalysis, Buddhist thought, etc). I view evolutionary psychology as in the category of psychological divination techniques, in which a set of predetermined systematic constraints allow you to locate interesting patterns in your day to day life through a process of reorientation. In all sincerity, I suggest astrology as an alternative technique that avoids any normative connotations of "fitness" etc.

FeepingCreature 5y ago
> In order to say things like "my brain" one is necessarily creating a distinction between themselves as thinking subject and a "lower self" which consists of a biological substrate. Come on, that's a stretch. I think it's clear from context that this is referring to unconscious vs conscious awareness, in the like one case where I failed to specifically highlight this distinction (because I wanted to head off just this claim). Both of course happen in the same slab of meat. > This was an issue that Kant grappled with, in that the mind cannot distance itself from itself. When we "understand the game theoretic strategy that our brain is executing", we are still implicated in other "game theoretic strategies", we've just made certain ones manifest and chosen to ignore others. Sure, but consider: [1] [2]. Of course conscious deliberation is just another strategy, but it's a strategy that benefits from clarity. There is no good reason why reason and deliberation should be unable to close over itself, let alone as "separate" a component as emotional state. Reason is a strategy that rose to some prominence in human evolutionary history because it is extraordinarily effective at making sense of the natural world. (Note: There's some claims that reason rose to prominence because it made humans good at making up sensible claims to deceive others - but this sort of evolutionary history would still produce a system that's good at inference, if only as a side effect. Compare GANs.) > that requires turning in the opposite direction: asking questions to the emotions themselves rather than to the world, which requires an entirely different conceptual toolkit Now who's doing dualism? The emotions are part of and arose from within the world. Without looking at the historical context in which they evolved, you may not be able to even understand what they're trying to tell you. And sure, a lot of evpsych is just-so trash. But especially around the game theory of emotions, I think the conclusions hold up. [1] https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/46qnWRSR7L2eyNbMA/the-lens-that-sees-its-flaws https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/46qnWRSR7L2eyNbMA/the-lens-t... [2] https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XPErvb8m9FapXCjhA/adaptation-executers-not-fitness-maximizers https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XPErvb8m9FapXCjhA/adaptation...
- Nav_Panel 5y ago
  > There is no good reason why reason and deliberation should be unable to close over itself, let alone as "separate" a component as emotional state. It can be done, but most rationalists never achieve this, in that it requires understanding the cause of emotion as it relates to one's own subjectivity. This often involves admitting hard truths about oneself, and is the process that psychoanalysis is intended to support. Instead they "rationalize", and come up with explanations like that one that follows, which don't understand the emotion so much as "explain it away" through what amounts to, as I said earlier, a metaphysical argument about the causal origins of the species. > Reason is a strategy that rose to some prominence in human evolutionary history because it is extraordinarily effective at making sense of the natural world. This sort of causal argument is why I tend to cringe at rationalist theory, because not only is it not necessarily true, there's no way to even tell if it were true. > The emotions are part of and arose from within the world. Without looking at the historical context in which they evolved, you may not be able to even understand what they're trying to tell you. Ironically I fully agree with this statement, except what I would mean by "historical context" is "the events in your own specific life that influenced your current sentiments", rather than history viewed as a totality. Again, a reference to the totality and causal origin of life; do you see why I describe it as theological or metaphysical? This is very similar in structure to Christian theories on the topic of e.g. original sin.
  - FeepingCreature 5y ago
    > This sort of causal argument is why I tend to cringe at rationalist theory, because not only is it not necessarily true, there's no way to even tell if it were true. I mean, to be fair I'm leaning myself out the window a lot with that claim. But it seems plausible, and more importantly, the argument is resilient to why reason arose. I'm not saying this in a sense of "this is definitely why we have reason, and that's why I am right"; I'm more saying "even in this case where we don't necessarily have reason because it's useful," (note the alternate theory I list) "that is still no reason (heh) to expect it to mislead us." And I think we can confidently say that reason is useful today, at least, and submit as evidence approximately the last 10000 years of planetary history. I think it's not a big stretch to claim that the reason that reason is useful today may be the reason that it evolved to begin with. > Ironically I fully agree with this statement, except what I would mean by "historical context" is "the events in your own specific life that influenced your current sentiments", rather than history viewed as a totality. And again, I don't see why it has to be one or the other. Of course, even and especially in "events in your own life" it is ironically very easy to make up pat just-so stories to justify any reaction or sentiment. In comparison I honestly think evpsych is on a firmer footing, particularly given I don't think psychotherapy needs particularly to be correct about the causes it posits in order to function as therapy. Whereas if you are mistaken about the evolutionary cause of an emotion, you will completely misconstrue it and probably behave badly. > It can be done, but most rationalists never achieve this, in that it requires understanding the cause of emotion as it relates to one's own subjectivity. This often involves admitting hard truths about oneself For instance, I am very leery of the notion of "hard truths", because it imbues an argument with value based on the emotional work performed in reasoning it out. This is the exact sort of thing rationality says should not be expected to work. - Something does not become more or less true by being hard to admit; an untruth can be as hard to admit as a truth. You need to have a cognitive mechanism that is in principle capable of producing truths to begin with, in order to even arrive at a hard truth that you can emotionally reject. Without that, you're liable to just admit hard made-up claims as a form of catharsis. Is something being hard to admit evidence that it is true? Yes, but weakly - if it weren't convincing enough to outweigh being hard to accept, you probably wouldn't even entertain it. (How to be convinced by things that are true but hard to accept is actually a core tenet of rationality - see How To Actually Change Your Mind linked above.) But you still have to do the work to arrive at a true belief about yourself to begin with.

FeepingCreature 5y ago

> In order to say things like "my brain" one is necessarily creating a distinction between themselves as thinking subject and a "lower self" which consists of a biological substrate. Come on, that's a stretch. I think it's clear from context that this is referring to unconscious vs conscious awareness, in the like one case where I failed to specifically highlight this distinction (because I wanted to head off just this claim). Both of course happen in the same slab of meat. > This was an issue that Kant grappled with, in that the mind cannot distance itself from itself. When we "understand the game theoretic strategy that our brain is executing", we are still implicated in other "game theoretic strategies", we've just made certain ones manifest and chosen to ignore others. Sure, but consider: [1] [2]. Of course conscious deliberation is just another strategy, but it's a strategy that benefits from clarity. There is no good reason why reason and deliberation should be unable to close over itself, let alone as "separate" a component as emotional state. Reason is a strategy that rose to some prominence in human evolutionary history because it is extraordinarily effective at making sense of the natural world. (Note: There's some claims that reason rose to prominence because it made humans good at making up sensible claims to deceive others - but this sort of evolutionary history would still produce a system that's good at inference, if only as a side effect. Compare GANs.) > that requires turning in the opposite direction: asking questions to the emotions themselves rather than to the world, which requires an entirely different conceptual toolkit Now who's doing dualism? The emotions are part of and arose from within the world. Without looking at the historical context in which they evolved, you may not be able to even understand what they're trying to tell you. And sure, a lot of evpsych is just-so trash. But especially around the game theory of emotions, I think the conclusions hold up. [1] https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/46qnWRSR7L2eyNbMA/the-lens-that-sees-its-flaws https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/46qnWRSR7L2eyNbMA/the-lens-t... [2] https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XPErvb8m9FapXCjhA/adaptation-executers-not-fitness-maximizers https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XPErvb8m9FapXCjhA/adaptation...

Nav_Panel 5y ago
> There is no good reason why reason and deliberation should be unable to close over itself, let alone as "separate" a component as emotional state. It can be done, but most rationalists never achieve this, in that it requires understanding the cause of emotion as it relates to one's own subjectivity. This often involves admitting hard truths about oneself, and is the process that psychoanalysis is intended to support. Instead they "rationalize", and come up with explanations like that one that follows, which don't understand the emotion so much as "explain it away" through what amounts to, as I said earlier, a metaphysical argument about the causal origins of the species. > Reason is a strategy that rose to some prominence in human evolutionary history because it is extraordinarily effective at making sense of the natural world. This sort of causal argument is why I tend to cringe at rationalist theory, because not only is it not necessarily true, there's no way to even tell if it were true. > The emotions are part of and arose from within the world. Without looking at the historical context in which they evolved, you may not be able to even understand what they're trying to tell you. Ironically I fully agree with this statement, except what I would mean by "historical context" is "the events in your own specific life that influenced your current sentiments", rather than history viewed as a totality. Again, a reference to the totality and causal origin of life; do you see why I describe it as theological or metaphysical? This is very similar in structure to Christian theories on the topic of e.g. original sin.
- FeepingCreature 5y ago
  > This sort of causal argument is why I tend to cringe at rationalist theory, because not only is it not necessarily true, there's no way to even tell if it were true. I mean, to be fair I'm leaning myself out the window a lot with that claim. But it seems plausible, and more importantly, the argument is resilient to why reason arose. I'm not saying this in a sense of "this is definitely why we have reason, and that's why I am right"; I'm more saying "even in this case where we don't necessarily have reason because it's useful," (note the alternate theory I list) "that is still no reason (heh) to expect it to mislead us." And I think we can confidently say that reason is useful today, at least, and submit as evidence approximately the last 10000 years of planetary history. I think it's not a big stretch to claim that the reason that reason is useful today may be the reason that it evolved to begin with. > Ironically I fully agree with this statement, except what I would mean by "historical context" is "the events in your own specific life that influenced your current sentiments", rather than history viewed as a totality. And again, I don't see why it has to be one or the other. Of course, even and especially in "events in your own life" it is ironically very easy to make up pat just-so stories to justify any reaction or sentiment. In comparison I honestly think evpsych is on a firmer footing, particularly given I don't think psychotherapy needs particularly to be correct about the causes it posits in order to function as therapy. Whereas if you are mistaken about the evolutionary cause of an emotion, you will completely misconstrue it and probably behave badly. > It can be done, but most rationalists never achieve this, in that it requires understanding the cause of emotion as it relates to one's own subjectivity. This often involves admitting hard truths about oneself For instance, I am very leery of the notion of "hard truths", because it imbues an argument with value based on the emotional work performed in reasoning it out. This is the exact sort of thing rationality says should not be expected to work. - Something does not become more or less true by being hard to admit; an untruth can be as hard to admit as a truth. You need to have a cognitive mechanism that is in principle capable of producing truths to begin with, in order to even arrive at a hard truth that you can emotionally reject. Without that, you're liable to just admit hard made-up claims as a form of catharsis. Is something being hard to admit evidence that it is true? Yes, but weakly - if it weren't convincing enough to outweigh being hard to accept, you probably wouldn't even entertain it. (How to be convinced by things that are true but hard to accept is actually a core tenet of rationality - see How To Actually Change Your Mind linked above.) But you still have to do the work to arrive at a true belief about yourself to begin with.