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We know they were working on it several years ago, but abandoned efforts over two years ago due to FBI push objections[1] Maybe they have restarted those effor
by phire 5y ago
We know they were working on it several years ago, but abandoned efforts over two years ago due to FBI push objections[1]
Maybe they have restarted those efforts, but with some modifications (like this?). It's hard to tell since Apple is a very secretive company, but the exact design of this system does strongly suggest end-to-end encryption of photos. (Why attach a decryption key to positive matches if the photo isn't encrypted?)
I guess it's also possible this was a project kicked of years ago before they abandoned the idea of end-to-end backups and it lived on as a zombie.
BTW, while I see Apple's PoV here, I don't think I agree with it. I think I'd rather they stick with the status quo. I'm curious what other people prefer: un-encrypted and subpoenable iCloud photos, or on-device CSAM scanning?
[1] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
- kemayo 5y agoI have a preference for the on-device scanning + e2e Photos. The overall security seems higher, assuming Apple's claims about photos only being scanned during the upload process are true. (If I don't trust Apple to be telling the truth about that, it's not like I could trust them to not already be scanning all my photos, so...)