5 ms·

This seems pretty cool, but I'm pretty sure that malware creators are going to be one of the main users.

• tinus_hn 5y ago
  What about the most important secrets of all, DRM keys?
  • na85 5y ago
    If they're visible to children surely you can inject a DLL and exec into a new child process with access to the key?
    • MathMonkeyMan 5y ago
      The file is closed on exec, I believe.
  • sleavey 5y ago
    If you wanted DRM keys, couldn't you just patch memfd_secret() to remove its security features, let the program use it, then have a look at the assigned memory?
    • c0l0 5y ago
      Sure, on paper, that will always be possible - just not in the age of signed kernel images that are cryptographically verified by your immutable bootloader.
      • deleted 5y ago
        [deleted]
      • remram 5y ago
        Do we live in that age? Are there any computers that can't be made to boot an unsigned image? My experience is that Secure Boot is optional.
        • MonadIsPronad 5y ago
          Win11 requiring TPM2.0 feels like it's edging ever closer to such an age... Can the latest iPhones boot unsigned OSs yet? I'm guessing the jailbreakers aren't _that_ fast.
        • kevincox 5y ago
          You can't score full marks on Android SafetyNet if you aren't using an unmodified stock ROM. https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation So yes, some apps will refuse to run and in theory some services could refuse to accept requests from devices that aren't running unmodified images. I can definitely imagine something like Snapchat using this as they have actually been fairly aggressive at trying to prevent "unauthorized clients" that can save images without notification to the user.
        • cmurf 5y ago
          Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specification mandates that Secure Boot can be disabled and customized, by a physically present user, on non-ARM platforms, in early versions of the Windows 10 spec. Disabling Secure Boot must not be possible on ARM systems. - WHCP-Systems-Specification-1511.pdf However, looking at the -2004 spec, both customization and enable/disable sections are prefaced with (Optional for systems intended to be locked down) so it is no longer mandatory, even on x86_64 systems, to provide a physically present user with the ability to disable or customize UEFI Secure Boot. The same language is used in the -21H2 spec for Windows 11. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/com...
  • surajrmal 5y ago
    DRM has long since trusted the kernel. Utilizing the TEE or other hardware based mechanisms for hiding the keys is common. For situations where that's not available they just simply don't offer degraded service.
  • zozbot234 5y ago
    Isn't that a special case of the former?
  • M2Ys4U 5y ago
    > What about the most important secrets of all, DRM keys? That falls squarely under malware, surely?