3 ms·

Agreed. If China can force Apple to do almost anything by threatening to ban iPhone sales, why bother with fake CSAM hashes? That just adds an extra step. It's

Agreed. If China can force Apple to do almost anything by threatening to ban iPhone sales, why bother with fake CSAM hashes? That just adds an extra step. It's not like the Chinese government needs to take pains to trick anyone about their attitude toward "subversive" material.

tshaddox 5y ago
Exactly. Apple can already ship literally any conceivable software to iPhones. Do people really think their plan was to sneak functionality into this update and then update the CSAM database later, and they would have gotten away with it if it weren't for the brilliant privacy advocates pointing out that this CSAM database could be changed over time? That's pretty ludicrous. If the Chinese government wanted to (and thought it had sufficient leverage over Apple), they could literally just tell Apple to issue a software update that streams all desired private data to Chinese government servers.
- giantrobot 5y ago
  > they could literally just tell Apple to issue a software update that streams all desired private data to Chinese government servers. Uh...this already happened. [0][1] [0] https://www.macrumors.com/2021/05/17/apple-security-compromises-china-icloud/ https://www.macrumors.com/2021/05/17/apple-security-compromi... [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208351 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208351
  - tshaddox 5y ago
    Not quite. Those are still ostensibly servers located in China but not directly controlled by the government (edit: apparently the hosting company is owned by Guizhou provincial government). But yes, this is precisely my point. Any slippery slope argument about Apple software on iPhones is equivalent to any conceivable slippery slope argument about Apple software on iPhones. If you're making one of these arguments, you're actually just arguing against Apple having the ability to issue software updates to iPhones (and by all means, make that argument!).
    - giantrobot 5y ago
      China's laws are such that there's no need for them to obtain a warrant for data housed on servers of Chinese companies. Not only do they not need a warrant but companies are required to facilitate their access. While the servers aren't controlled by the Chinese government, government law enforcement and intelligence agencies have essentially free access to that data.
    - AussieWog93 5y ago
      > ostensibly servers located in China but not directly controlled by the government "ostensibly" is the key word there. If the datacenter is physically located in China, then there's a CCP official on the board of the company that controls it.
- noptd 5y ago
  So your argument boils down to since Apple can already install software without us knowing, we shouldn't worry about a new client-side system that makes it substantially easier for nation states to abuse? I don't find that argument the least bit compelling.
  - tshaddox 5y ago
    I’m not saying that we shouldn’t be concerned with Apple actually launching things that are bad. I’m saying we shouldn’t make arguments of the form “this isn’t bad yet, but they could change this later to make it bad.” Because obviously they can change anything later to be bad. If the system as currently described is a violation of privacy, or can be abused by governments, etc. then just make that argument.
sangnoir 5y ago
> why bother with fake CSAM hashes? Because Apple has already built that functionality, and it exists? What alternative dragnet currently exists to identify iOS users who possess certain images? This would be code reuse.
nodamage 5y ago
This situation reminds me a lot of the controversy around Google's changes to code signing for Play Store apps. (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27176690 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27176690) In both cases people are stretching to come up with hypothetical scenarios about how these systems could be abused by a government ("they could force Apple to insert non-CSAM hashes into their database" or "they could force Google to insert a backdoor into your app") while completely ignoring the elephant in the room: if a government wanted to do these things, they already have the power to do so. If your concern is that a government might force Apple or Google to do X or pull product sales in their country, whether Apple performs on-device CSAM scanning vs scanning it on their servers, or whether Google signs your app vs you signing it doesn't materially change anything about that concern. The outrage around this particular situation is even more confusing to me because you can opt out entirely by disabling iCloud Photos, and if you were already using iCloud Photos then the scanning was already happening on Apple's servers anyway, so the only actual change is that the scan now occurs before instead of after the upload.

tshaddox 5y ago

Exactly. Apple can already ship literally any conceivable software to iPhones. Do people really think their plan was to sneak functionality into this update and then update the CSAM database later, and they would have gotten away with it if it weren't for the brilliant privacy advocates pointing out that this CSAM database could be changed over time? That's pretty ludicrous. If the Chinese government wanted to (and thought it had sufficient leverage over Apple), they could literally just tell Apple to issue a software update that streams all desired private data to Chinese government servers.

giantrobot 5y ago
> they could literally just tell Apple to issue a software update that streams all desired private data to Chinese government servers. Uh...this already happened. [0][1] [0] https://www.macrumors.com/2021/05/17/apple-security-compromises-china-icloud/ https://www.macrumors.com/2021/05/17/apple-security-compromi... [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208351 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208351
- tshaddox 5y ago
  Not quite. Those are still ostensibly servers located in China but not directly controlled by the government (edit: apparently the hosting company is owned by Guizhou provincial government). But yes, this is precisely my point. Any slippery slope argument about Apple software on iPhones is equivalent to any conceivable slippery slope argument about Apple software on iPhones. If you're making one of these arguments, you're actually just arguing against Apple having the ability to issue software updates to iPhones (and by all means, make that argument!).
  - giantrobot 5y ago
    China's laws are such that there's no need for them to obtain a warrant for data housed on servers of Chinese companies. Not only do they not need a warrant but companies are required to facilitate their access. While the servers aren't controlled by the Chinese government, government law enforcement and intelligence agencies have essentially free access to that data.
  - AussieWog93 5y ago
    > ostensibly servers located in China but not directly controlled by the government "ostensibly" is the key word there. If the datacenter is physically located in China, then there's a CCP official on the board of the company that controls it.
noptd 5y ago
So your argument boils down to since Apple can already install software without us knowing, we shouldn't worry about a new client-side system that makes it substantially easier for nation states to abuse? I don't find that argument the least bit compelling.
- tshaddox 5y ago
  I’m not saying that we shouldn’t be concerned with Apple actually launching things that are bad. I’m saying we shouldn’t make arguments of the form “this isn’t bad yet, but they could change this later to make it bad.” Because obviously they can change anything later to be bad. If the system as currently described is a violation of privacy, or can be abused by governments, etc. then just make that argument.

sangnoir 5y ago

> why bother with fake CSAM hashes? Because Apple has already built that functionality, and it exists? What alternative dragnet currently exists to identify iOS users who possess certain images? This would be code reuse.

nodamage 5y ago

This situation reminds me a lot of the controversy around Google's changes to code signing for Play Store apps. (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27176690 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27176690) In both cases people are stretching to come up with hypothetical scenarios about how these systems could be abused by a government ("they could force Apple to insert non-CSAM hashes into their database" or "they could force Google to insert a backdoor into your app") while completely ignoring the elephant in the room: if a government wanted to do these things, they already have the power to do so. If your concern is that a government might force Apple or Google to do X or pull product sales in their country, whether Apple performs on-device CSAM scanning vs scanning it on their servers, or whether Google signs your app vs you signing it doesn't materially change anything about that concern. The outrage around this particular situation is even more confusing to me because you can opt out entirely by disabling iCloud Photos, and if you were already using iCloud Photos then the scanning was already happening on Apple's servers anyway, so the only actual change is that the scan now occurs before instead of after the upload.