12 ms·

Pretty clear cut for me: iMessage either offers robust end-to-end encryption , or it doesn’t. (Intentional backdoors place it in the latter ofcourse). I want

by bobbob1921 5y ago

Pretty clear cut for me: iMessage either offers robust end-to-end encryption , or it doesn’t. (Intentional backdoors place it in the latter ofcourse). I want true end to end enc.

djrogers 5y ago
How is it not still E2EE?
- sigmar 5y ago
  If a copy of your messages (even if it is only low resolution jpgs) get auto forwarded to Apple/FBI under certain circumstances it is not securely E2E encrypted
  - wyldfire 5y ago
    Apple's investigation code executes on the device, which allows them to preserve their definition of end-to-end as long as you plug your ears and ignore where the 'ends' are.
    - zionic 5y ago
      I’m not interested in Apple’s newspeak definition of “E2EE” (where they are between the ends) or “Privacy” (terms and restrictions may apply). I want the real thing.
      - ollien 5y ago
        In this case, they wouldn't be "between" the ends, no? They'd be _at_ the ends, just as sending a message on Signal doesn't prevent someone from stealing your phone and reading your messages. I'm not in agreement with this being ok, but if it truly is on device, it still technically can be E2EE
        wyldfire 5y ago
        > but if it truly is on device, it still technically can be E2EE What do you think this software does when it finds a matching hash entry? Toss a notification to ask you nicely to pop round your nearest FBI office? What meaning does 'end-to-end' have anymore if this applies? If Apple wrote software on-device to forward a copy of all messages prior to encryption to iCloud for 'backup', would it still be end-to-end? What if they sent it to an AdTech firm to index for interesting terms that match products you should be pitched? The software in this case is still Apple's, running on-device.
        ollien 5y ago
        E2EE implies it's encrypted between the two parties exchanging messages, which it still is. I'm not suggesting that this isn't an immoral circumvention of the system, but it's still certainly end to end encrypted between the two clients, given that the scanning is performed on device, and not in transit.
      - wyldfire 5y ago
        > I want the real thing. If you used iOS/iMessage, you have always trusted Apple. To be truly 'end to end' you would assume that there's no opportunity for another party to intercept your messages: the only trust would be in the keys you exchanged with your peer. 1. They are a trusted broker for iMessage key exchanges. You didn't do the key exchange, you assumed that when Apple did so on your behalf that you're really communicating with the peer you think you are. 2. They designed the iOS features that you trust keep iMessage data inaccessible to other untrusted software on your device. 3. They designed the secure enclave and make public statements that they won't compromise it for law enforcement. You trust that their deeds in private match their public statements.
        fartcannon 5y ago
        They used to trust Apple, now they have learned they shouldn't trust Apple. This is progress.
  - aj3 5y ago
    It’s not forwarded to Apple/FBI though, under any circumstances.
    - sigmar 5y ago
      the 'visual derivative' of photos on your device are sent to apple
      - tpush 5y ago
        That is the CSAM iCloud photo stuff; iMessage has nothing to do with that.
        sigmar 5y ago
        The subheadline- >More than 90 policy and rights groups ask company to abandon plans for scanning phones of adults for images of child sex abuse.
        tpush 5y ago
        This thread is about iMessage, and the sub headline you quoted is about CSAM scanning that only concerns iCloud Photo Library.
      - djrogers 5y ago
        No, they aren't. You're conflating two completely separate features, and this thread is specifically about the iMessage one. I'd suggest you read up a bit on this - https://www.apple.com/child-safety/ https://www.apple.com/child-safety/ What we're discussing is this feature: "The Messages app will add new tools to warn children and their parents when receiving or sending sexually explicit photos. When receiving this type of content, the photo will be blurred and the child will be warned, presented with helpful resources, and reassured it is okay if they do not want to view this photo. As an additional precaution, the child can also be told that, to make sure they are safe, their parents will get a message if they do view it. Similar protections are available if a child attempts to send sexually explicit photos. The child will be warned before the photo is sent, and the parents can receive a message if the child chooses to send it. Messages uses on-device machine learning to analyze image attachments and determine if a photo is sexually explicit. The feature is designed so that Apple does not get access to the messages." There are no visual derivatives, no neural hashes, and nothing is sent to apple.
  - tpush 5y ago
    No copies of any iMessages get automatically forwarded to anywhere. The iMessage stuff is not the same as the CSAM scanning iCloud photo stuff.
  - djrogers 5y ago
    That's not what happens with the iMessage feature - that's what happens with the iCloud photo library CSAM scanning feature, and iCloud photo library has never been E2EE.
- 238475235243 5y ago
  Maybe it's the expandable back door reporting mechanism that Apple wants to put in there?
  - djrogers 5y ago
    That's not related to iMessage - that's an iCloud photo library thing. iCloud photo library has never been E2EE.
robertoandred 5y ago
iMessage already analyzes your messages to preview urls, show YouTube videos, highlight dates, etc. Are those also backdoors?
- npteljes 5y ago
  How do they manage the previews? Skype, for one, uses their servers to get the preview. Vastly different from a client-side preview (which some people wouldn't want either).
  - skygazer 5y ago
    iMessage link preview images are generated by the sender. https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2444/_index.html https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2444...
- deleted 5y ago
  [deleted]
- coconut_man 5y ago
  I don't think so, it doesn't really need to "analyze" your messages to do preview urls, show videos... Those are more like frontend stuff IMO
  - robertoandred 5y ago
    No more frontend than running a basic subject recognition on a photo.
    - blitzar 5y ago
      A bit like on-device machine learning features, like object detection in images and video, language analysis, and sound classification?
      - robertoandred 5y ago
wyldfire 5y ago
> I want true end to end enc. People who say things like this rarely also want the hassle that comes with it. Key exchanges, re-keying: all a big PITA. But iMessage (and WhatsApp) do key exchanges facilitated by a trusted broker. If you didn't trust the broker, you would have to do more work when making an initial exchange with a peer and more work if they lost their phone/keys. iMessage has always been a compromise with subtle rough edges. But we trusted Apple because they talked about privacy and made it clear that their business model meant that we should trust them more than competitors. But now, precisely because of how good and effective they secured their devices -- they fear regulation and thought that they could further compromise things and people would go along with it.
- whatshisface 5y ago
  Key exchange would be easy in real life, just bump phones when you meet someone. It's only difficult on IRC.
  - theshrike79 5y ago
    So key signing parties would resurface? :)
  - wyldfire 5y ago
    Yes and no. It's not 'hard' it's just friction that's not present at baseline (when iMessage was designed, and for the most part still today). Sometimes you send messages to someone who you haven't ever met in person, or you met but didn't think to exchange keys at the time. And when Dave drops his phone in the lake and buys a new one, he would have to sheepishly re-meetup with everyone he interacts with. If iMessage had been designed to require a brokerless key exchange, its security would be superior (though in this case, Apple's interception software trumps everything). But iMessage would appear to be less convenient than alternatives like WhatsApp (brokered key exchange, re-keying).
    - whatshisface 5y ago
      It could offer both brokered and brokerless key exchange, distinguishing between messages from parties verified through each method by, I dunno, the color of the text bubble.

Pretty clear cut for me: iMessage either offers robust end-to-end encryption , or it doesn’t. (Intentional backdoors place it in the latter ofcourse). I want true end to end enc.

djrogers 5y ago

How is it not still E2EE?

sigmar 5y ago
If a copy of your messages (even if it is only low resolution jpgs) get auto forwarded to Apple/FBI under certain circumstances it is not securely E2E encrypted
- wyldfire 5y ago
  Apple's investigation code executes on the device, which allows them to preserve their definition of end-to-end as long as you plug your ears and ignore where the 'ends' are.
  - zionic 5y ago
    I’m not interested in Apple’s newspeak definition of “E2EE” (where they are between the ends) or “Privacy” (terms and restrictions may apply). I want the real thing.
    - ollien 5y ago
      In this case, they wouldn't be "between" the ends, no? They'd be _at_ the ends, just as sending a message on Signal doesn't prevent someone from stealing your phone and reading your messages. I'm not in agreement with this being ok, but if it truly is on device, it still technically can be E2EE
      - wyldfire 5y ago
        > but if it truly is on device, it still technically can be E2EE What do you think this software does when it finds a matching hash entry? Toss a notification to ask you nicely to pop round your nearest FBI office? What meaning does 'end-to-end' have anymore if this applies? If Apple wrote software on-device to forward a copy of all messages prior to encryption to iCloud for 'backup', would it still be end-to-end? What if they sent it to an AdTech firm to index for interesting terms that match products you should be pitched? The software in this case is still Apple's, running on-device.
        ollien 5y ago
        E2EE implies it's encrypted between the two parties exchanging messages, which it still is. I'm not suggesting that this isn't an immoral circumvention of the system, but it's still certainly end to end encrypted between the two clients, given that the scanning is performed on device, and not in transit.
    - wyldfire 5y ago
      > I want the real thing. If you used iOS/iMessage, you have always trusted Apple. To be truly 'end to end' you would assume that there's no opportunity for another party to intercept your messages: the only trust would be in the keys you exchanged with your peer. 1. They are a trusted broker for iMessage key exchanges. You didn't do the key exchange, you assumed that when Apple did so on your behalf that you're really communicating with the peer you think you are. 2. They designed the iOS features that you trust keep iMessage data inaccessible to other untrusted software on your device. 3. They designed the secure enclave and make public statements that they won't compromise it for law enforcement. You trust that their deeds in private match their public statements.
      - fartcannon 5y ago
        They used to trust Apple, now they have learned they shouldn't trust Apple. This is progress.
- aj3 5y ago
  It’s not forwarded to Apple/FBI though, under any circumstances.
  - sigmar 5y ago
    the 'visual derivative' of photos on your device are sent to apple
    - tpush 5y ago
      That is the CSAM iCloud photo stuff; iMessage has nothing to do with that.
      - sigmar 5y ago
        The subheadline- >More than 90 policy and rights groups ask company to abandon plans for scanning phones of adults for images of child sex abuse.
        tpush 5y ago
        This thread is about iMessage, and the sub headline you quoted is about CSAM scanning that only concerns iCloud Photo Library.
    - djrogers 5y ago
      No, they aren't. You're conflating two completely separate features, and this thread is specifically about the iMessage one. I'd suggest you read up a bit on this - https://www.apple.com/child-safety/ https://www.apple.com/child-safety/ What we're discussing is this feature: "The Messages app will add new tools to warn children and their parents when receiving or sending sexually explicit photos. When receiving this type of content, the photo will be blurred and the child will be warned, presented with helpful resources, and reassured it is okay if they do not want to view this photo. As an additional precaution, the child can also be told that, to make sure they are safe, their parents will get a message if they do view it. Similar protections are available if a child attempts to send sexually explicit photos. The child will be warned before the photo is sent, and the parents can receive a message if the child chooses to send it. Messages uses on-device machine learning to analyze image attachments and determine if a photo is sexually explicit. The feature is designed so that Apple does not get access to the messages." There are no visual derivatives, no neural hashes, and nothing is sent to apple.
- tpush 5y ago
  No copies of any iMessages get automatically forwarded to anywhere. The iMessage stuff is not the same as the CSAM scanning iCloud photo stuff.
- djrogers 5y ago
  That's not what happens with the iMessage feature - that's what happens with the iCloud photo library CSAM scanning feature, and iCloud photo library has never been E2EE.
238475235243 5y ago
Maybe it's the expandable back door reporting mechanism that Apple wants to put in there?
- djrogers 5y ago
  That's not related to iMessage - that's an iCloud photo library thing. iCloud photo library has never been E2EE.

robertoandred 5y ago

iMessage already analyzes your messages to preview urls, show YouTube videos, highlight dates, etc. Are those also backdoors?

npteljes 5y ago
How do they manage the previews? Skype, for one, uses their servers to get the preview. Vastly different from a client-side preview (which some people wouldn't want either).
- skygazer 5y ago
  iMessage link preview images are generated by the sender. https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2444/_index.html https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2444...
deleted 5y ago
[deleted]
coconut_man 5y ago
I don't think so, it doesn't really need to "analyze" your messages to do preview urls, show videos... Those are more like frontend stuff IMO
- robertoandred 5y ago
  No more frontend than running a basic subject recognition on a photo.
  - blitzar 5y ago
    A bit like on-device machine learning features, like object detection in images and video, language analysis, and sound classification?
    - robertoandred 5y ago

wyldfire 5y ago

> I want true end to end enc. People who say things like this rarely also want the hassle that comes with it. Key exchanges, re-keying: all a big PITA. But iMessage (and WhatsApp) do key exchanges facilitated by a trusted broker. If you didn't trust the broker, you would have to do more work when making an initial exchange with a peer and more work if they lost their phone/keys. iMessage has always been a compromise with subtle rough edges. But we trusted Apple because they talked about privacy and made it clear that their business model meant that we should trust them more than competitors. But now, precisely because of how good and effective they secured their devices -- they fear regulation and thought that they could further compromise things and people would go along with it.

whatshisface 5y ago
Key exchange would be easy in real life, just bump phones when you meet someone. It's only difficult on IRC.
- theshrike79 5y ago
  So key signing parties would resurface? :)
- wyldfire 5y ago
  Yes and no. It's not 'hard' it's just friction that's not present at baseline (when iMessage was designed, and for the most part still today). Sometimes you send messages to someone who you haven't ever met in person, or you met but didn't think to exchange keys at the time. And when Dave drops his phone in the lake and buys a new one, he would have to sheepishly re-meetup with everyone he interacts with. If iMessage had been designed to require a brokerless key exchange, its security would be superior (though in this case, Apple's interception software trumps everything). But iMessage would appear to be less convenient than alternatives like WhatsApp (brokered key exchange, re-keying).
  - whatshisface 5y ago
    It could offer both brokered and brokerless key exchange, distinguishing between messages from parties verified through each method by, I dunno, the color of the text bubble.