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To defeat this, all you need to be is a state actor with a database of child porn at your disposal (which is stored for exactly the purpose of training detectio
by bArray 5y ago
To defeat this, all you need to be is a state actor with a database of child porn at your disposal (which is stored for exactly the purpose of training detection systems). Then you run the hashing algorithm against images you know are in the database (Apple suggested that they would accept suggestions by some kind of multi-Country vote). Then you can pull out the hashes and figure out how to trigger false positives on the important vectors.
Next, embed your images in sites of interest, like:
* A meme in some group
* A document or 'leak'
* An email to a journalist
Wait for somebody to save it to their Apply device. Wait for it to be flagged and then use that as 'reasonable means to conduct a search'. When asking for a warrant, the agency would say something like "we detected possible CSAM on a device, the likelihood of a false match is extremely low" - a judge will hardly press further.
You now essentially have a weapon where you can search any Apple device in the name of preventing the distribution of CSAM.
Failing that, you could just have `document_leak.pdf` and download a file that is both a valid PDF and a child porn image, depending on which program you open it with.
- godelski 5y agoThere's already a problem that Apple can't verify the hashes. Say a government wants to investigate a certain set of people. Those people probably share specific memes and photos. Add those hashes to the list and now you have reasonable cause to investigate these people. Honestly this even adds to the danger of hash collisions because now you can get someone on a terrorist watch list as well as the kiddy porn list.
- ec109685 5y agoApple is the one doing the first line of investigation.
- ec109685 5y agoThis doesn’t work for two reasons: 1) There’s no way to know the perceptual hash value of Apple’s private NeuralHash function that is run on the derivative of the image server side to verify a hit really is CSAM. So while you could cause a collision with the on device neural hash if you possessed illegal content, you wouldn’t know if you successfully faked Apple’s private neuralhash implementation. 2) An Apple reviewer must verify the image is illegal before it’s passed along to law enforcement.