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No, probably wouldnt even get to the desk of the police. End of the road would be NCMEC, to whom apple would refer hash matching images that pass human verifica

No, probably wouldnt even get to the desk of the police. End of the road would be NCMEC, to whom apple would refer hash matching images that pass human verification that are close enough to porn. If your 30 or so hash matching images matched their corresponding known CSAM then that goes on to the police and then they knock on your door.

rlpb 5y ago
> to whom apple would refer hash matching images that pass human verification I am under the impression that Apple's scheme allows them only to verify the output of the matching algorithm (the "safety vouchers"), and not the image content itself. So in the hypothetical situation described in the thread, it won't be possible for Apple to detect the false positive, and they could pass on the report to NCMEC. I fear that this will lead to a law enforcement raid without any actual human verification of the offending image itself. If I'm wrong, I welcome citations which demonstrate the opposite.
- shapefrog 5y ago
  Happy to provide citation of how the apple scheme works [1]. You should also point out that the NCMEC themselves are not law enforcment. [1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
  - rlpb 5y ago
    Right, and what in there suggests to you that Apple can view an image after a sufficient number of images match? I see the opposite: "Apple can’t access metadata or visual derivatives for matched CSAM images until a threshold of matches is exceeded for an iCloud Photos account." That suggests that Apple can't access the actual matched CSAM images at all. > You should also point out that the NCMEC themselves are not law enforcment. I don't think the distinction is relevant. The point is that they will get passed on for enforcement purposes, and at that point, innocent parties will find themselves raided and their devices seized without any human actually manually verifying that it is CSAM first.

rlpb 5y ago

> to whom apple would refer hash matching images that pass human verification I am under the impression that Apple's scheme allows them only to verify the output of the matching algorithm (the "safety vouchers"), and not the image content itself. So in the hypothetical situation described in the thread, it won't be possible for Apple to detect the false positive, and they could pass on the report to NCMEC. I fear that this will lead to a law enforcement raid without any actual human verification of the offending image itself. If I'm wrong, I welcome citations which demonstrate the opposite.

shapefrog 5y ago
Happy to provide citation of how the apple scheme works [1]. You should also point out that the NCMEC themselves are not law enforcment. [1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
- rlpb 5y ago
  Right, and what in there suggests to you that Apple can view an image after a sufficient number of images match? I see the opposite: "Apple can’t access metadata or visual derivatives for matched CSAM images until a threshold of matches is exceeded for an iCloud Photos account." That suggests that Apple can't access the actual matched CSAM images at all. > You should also point out that the NCMEC themselves are not law enforcment. I don't think the distinction is relevant. The point is that they will get passed on for enforcement purposes, and at that point, innocent parties will find themselves raided and their devices seized without any human actually manually verifying that it is CSAM first.