There’s little point in E2E encryption if snooping is moved outside of either end. This measure is only necessary for implementing E2E in iCloud insofar as it a

There’s little point in E2E encryption if snooping is moved outside of either end. This measure is only necessary for implementing E2E in iCloud insofar as it allows the feds to do the very thing I want E2E to prevent them from doing in the first place. It’s as if USPS invented a new type of envelope that is physically impossible to open for anyone whose name is not written on the outside of it. Just one caveat: before they’ll give you any of these envelopes, you must allow them to read the letters being put inside. If your concern is someone intercepting your mail before it gets to its intended recipient, this is great news. If your threat model involves federal agencies reading your mail, you’re no better off than you would be without these fancy new envelopes.