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> There is a rule of thumb that attackers need to outnumber defenders 3 to 1 in order to win. But that assumes the defenders actually want to do their job. Tha

> There is a rule of thumb that attackers need to outnumber defenders 3 to 1 in order to win. But that assumes the defenders actually want to do their job. That is more of a rule for an individual battle. The Afghan army cannot mass all its troops for a battle. They have to attempt to hold large amounts of territory, spreading themselves thin. The Taliban can mass troops in specific areas, so it outnumbers the defenders, and then move on. It is not accurate or fair to portray the ANA as some sort of clearly superior force that just doesn’t feel like fighting.

T-A 5y ago
> The Taliban can mass troops in specific areas, so it outnumbers the defenders, and then move on. At which point the army could not just move back in and retake the "lost" area because...?
- 542354234235 5y ago
  >At which point the army could not just move back in and retake the "lost" area because Welcome to the last 20 years of counter insurgency in Afghanistan.
  - T-A 5y ago
    Not only didn't you answer the question; you invoked a history which contradicts your model. The Taliban did not roll through Afghanistan as a big wrecking ball. A moment of thought would tell you that this model does not match the growing area they controlled, nor the way it grew toward Kabul from all sides. Nor is it plausible that the army, with more than double the troops, better vehicles and air support would be unable to converge on your hypothetical wrecking ball. The Taliban avoided big battles, because they always lost those. By all accounts, their final advance was so rapid only because they met virtually no resistance. When they reached Kabul, they initially stayed outside the city, until word got out that the military and police had abandoned their positions and looting was underway, at which point they announced that they were going in to restore order.

T-A 5y ago

> The Taliban can mass troops in specific areas, so it outnumbers the defenders, and then move on. At which point the army could not just move back in and retake the "lost" area because...?

542354234235 5y ago
>At which point the army could not just move back in and retake the "lost" area because Welcome to the last 20 years of counter insurgency in Afghanistan.
- T-A 5y ago
  Not only didn't you answer the question; you invoked a history which contradicts your model. The Taliban did not roll through Afghanistan as a big wrecking ball. A moment of thought would tell you that this model does not match the growing area they controlled, nor the way it grew toward Kabul from all sides. Nor is it plausible that the army, with more than double the troops, better vehicles and air support would be unable to converge on your hypothetical wrecking ball. The Taliban avoided big battles, because they always lost those. By all accounts, their final advance was so rapid only because they met virtually no resistance. When they reached Kabul, they initially stayed outside the city, until word got out that the military and police had abandoned their positions and looting was underway, at which point they announced that they were going in to restore order.