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From the article: The group is thought to now be stronger in numbers than at any point since they were ousted in 2001 - with up to 85,000 full time fighters, a

by T-A 5y ago

From the article: The group is thought to now be stronger in numbers than at any point since they were ousted in 2001 - with up to 85,000 full time fighters, according to recent Nato estimates. So less than half of the Afghan National Army's 180,000 troops: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_National_Army There is a rule of thumb that attackers need to outnumber defenders 3 to 1 in order to win. But that assumes the defenders actually want to do their job.

mrighele 5y ago
I'm not surprised defenders didn't want to do their job, since they were lacking ammos and even food [1]. "Soldiers in Ghurmach in the northern province of Faryab had spoken to a local media about the same topic just a month before, saying, "We haven't eaten for days. We only have four sacks of flour for 400 soldiers. No one cares about us. We can't fight the Taliban on only bread and water."" It seems that endemic corruptions was one of the main reasons. "[...] In May 2018, the police in Badghis province in the north-west of Afghanistan confirmed that a contractor that provided food to Afghan security forces was serving up dog meat. " "[...] According to the same report, there are thousands of 'ghost soldiers' in the ranks of the Afghan army: soldiers who exist only on paper, allowing commanders to inflate their budgets and fill their pockets. An Afghan army soldier earns only 200 dollars a month. " With all the money that was funneled from the coalition, this doesn't surprise me. In hindsight, I don't see how the Afghan government could have ever survived the Taliban without indefinite presence of the USA. https://observers.france24.com/en/20200218-afghanistan-corruption-rations-soldiers-army-eat https://observers.france24.com/en/20200218-afghanistan-corru...
- ALittleLight 5y ago
  It would've required the US to do something more sophisticated than giving money to a bunch of corrupt thieves and hoping things work out. US military or civilian leadership is ultimately responsible for the failure even if the Afghan National Army was a complete failure. The ANA was organized and maintained by the US.
  - deleted 5y ago
    [deleted]
542354234235 5y ago
> There is a rule of thumb that attackers need to outnumber defenders 3 to 1 in order to win. But that assumes the defenders actually want to do their job. That is more of a rule for an individual battle. The Afghan army cannot mass all its troops for a battle. They have to attempt to hold large amounts of territory, spreading themselves thin. The Taliban can mass troops in specific areas, so it outnumbers the defenders, and then move on. It is not accurate or fair to portray the ANA as some sort of clearly superior force that just doesn’t feel like fighting.
- T-A 5y ago
  > The Taliban can mass troops in specific areas, so it outnumbers the defenders, and then move on. At which point the army could not just move back in and retake the "lost" area because...?
  - 542354234235 5y ago
    >At which point the army could not just move back in and retake the "lost" area because Welcome to the last 20 years of counter insurgency in Afghanistan.
    - T-A 5y ago
      Not only didn't you answer the question; you invoked a history which contradicts your model. The Taliban did not roll through Afghanistan as a big wrecking ball. A moment of thought would tell you that this model does not match the growing area they controlled, nor the way it grew toward Kabul from all sides. Nor is it plausible that the army, with more than double the troops, better vehicles and air support would be unable to converge on your hypothetical wrecking ball. The Taliban avoided big battles, because they always lost those. By all accounts, their final advance was so rapid only because they met virtually no resistance. When they reached Kabul, they initially stayed outside the city, until word got out that the military and police had abandoned their positions and looting was underway, at which point they announced that they were going in to restore order.

by T-A 5y ago

mrighele 5y ago

I'm not surprised defenders didn't want to do their job, since they were lacking ammos and even food [1]. "Soldiers in Ghurmach in the northern province of Faryab had spoken to a local media about the same topic just a month before, saying, "We haven't eaten for days. We only have four sacks of flour for 400 soldiers. No one cares about us. We can't fight the Taliban on only bread and water."" It seems that endemic corruptions was one of the main reasons. "[...] In May 2018, the police in Badghis province in the north-west of Afghanistan confirmed that a contractor that provided food to Afghan security forces was serving up dog meat. " "[...] According to the same report, there are thousands of 'ghost soldiers' in the ranks of the Afghan army: soldiers who exist only on paper, allowing commanders to inflate their budgets and fill their pockets. An Afghan army soldier earns only 200 dollars a month. " With all the money that was funneled from the coalition, this doesn't surprise me. In hindsight, I don't see how the Afghan government could have ever survived the Taliban without indefinite presence of the USA. https://observers.france24.com/en/20200218-afghanistan-corruption-rations-soldiers-army-eat https://observers.france24.com/en/20200218-afghanistan-corru...

ALittleLight 5y ago
It would've required the US to do something more sophisticated than giving money to a bunch of corrupt thieves and hoping things work out. US military or civilian leadership is ultimately responsible for the failure even if the Afghan National Army was a complete failure. The ANA was organized and maintained by the US.
- deleted 5y ago
  [deleted]

542354234235 5y ago

> There is a rule of thumb that attackers need to outnumber defenders 3 to 1 in order to win. But that assumes the defenders actually want to do their job. That is more of a rule for an individual battle. The Afghan army cannot mass all its troops for a battle. They have to attempt to hold large amounts of territory, spreading themselves thin. The Taliban can mass troops in specific areas, so it outnumbers the defenders, and then move on. It is not accurate or fair to portray the ANA as some sort of clearly superior force that just doesn’t feel like fighting.

T-A 5y ago
> The Taliban can mass troops in specific areas, so it outnumbers the defenders, and then move on. At which point the army could not just move back in and retake the "lost" area because...?
- 542354234235 5y ago
  >At which point the army could not just move back in and retake the "lost" area because Welcome to the last 20 years of counter insurgency in Afghanistan.
  - T-A 5y ago
    Not only didn't you answer the question; you invoked a history which contradicts your model. The Taliban did not roll through Afghanistan as a big wrecking ball. A moment of thought would tell you that this model does not match the growing area they controlled, nor the way it grew toward Kabul from all sides. Nor is it plausible that the army, with more than double the troops, better vehicles and air support would be unable to converge on your hypothetical wrecking ball. The Taliban avoided big battles, because they always lost those. By all accounts, their final advance was so rapid only because they met virtually no resistance. When they reached Kabul, they initially stayed outside the city, until word got out that the military and police had abandoned their positions and looting was underway, at which point they announced that they were going in to restore order.