3 ms·

I have worked at a few projects at a few companies and I’ve seen some interesting cycles over the years. The pattern I’m thinking of goes something like: * mot

I have worked at a few projects at a few companies and I’ve seen some interesting cycles over the years. The pattern I’m thinking of goes something like: * motivated/passionate/skilled engineers/builders/scientists make a thing happen * what starts out as a healthy balance between doer/creators and business/decider/facilitators slowly tips towards the latter * economic cycles and other disruptive actions cause the passionate engineers that make things happen to depart to other pastures * management/business continues to consolidate decision making prerogative and fails to realize that they are left with engineers of a more compliant ilk (not necessarily worse, just more willing to do as told and less incline to exercise risk taking initiative) * progress slows to a trickle I’m curious if anyone with insider information can speak to the possibility that this has happened in Boeing’s space division. The symptoms seem similar from afar. Like others, I wish the engineers success from afar, because I would really want to succeed in an endeavor like this. But I know sometimes the engineers can become largely a body of people just willing to get the days tasks completed and that’s enough for them.

ohazi 5y ago
> I’m curious if anyone with insider information can speak to the possibility that this has happened in Boeing’s space division. s/in Boeing’s space division/at Boeing/ There's also the MCAS fiasco on the 737 MAX.
anonLL77 5y ago
Boeing is an engineering and manufacturing company, that is the culture. There are a lot of false narratives out there about Boeing's internal culture being a bunch of bean counters, etc. Of course there are pockets inside any large company that may not be ideal and mistakes are made in the development of any complex system. In my experience, however, Boeing is filled with dedicated engineering professionals trying to do the right thing in the face of increasing complexity. Sometimes there are structural problems in an organization and you get bad results despite everybody's best efforts. Boeing, like the government, has a lot of antiquated heavy weight processes that slow development down. As a field matures, it gets more complex, many past mistakes result in new processes to follow. Eventually, it is cruft that is difficult to remove and hard to navigate. Overtime, this increases development costs and slows projects down. Personally, probably the most difficult thing I've experienced is moving towards iterative processes (away from waterfall) and having a government customer wanting to support it but not really being able to. For example, if one were to begin to develop/evolve a complex system, the government about half way through would want a list of materials so they can be reviewed for a variety or purposes. Well, in an evolving system, this list is generally everchanging as people learn more about the domain and are able to make better choices over time. Something as simple as a list of materials can create all kinds of headaches. I could probably give a dozen or so examples where the government wants to, but cannot interface with modern engineering programs and practices. I also know that both the government and Boeing are trying to change, but it is difficult to change direction when so much of a large behemoth is made to work a certain way.
- hinkley 5y ago
  > Boeing is an engineering and manufacturing company, Boeing was an engineering and manufacturing company. Then they bought McDonnell Douglas but MD executives ended up in the management chain.
throwawaylinux 5y ago
Pournelle's Iron Law of Bureaucracy states that in any bureaucratic organization there will be two kinds of people: First, there will be those who are devoted to the goals of the organization. Examples are dedicated classroom teachers in an educational bureaucracy, many of the engineers and launch technicians and scientists at NASA, even some agricultural scientists and advisors in the former Soviet Union collective farming administration. Secondly, there will be those dedicated to the organization itself. Examples are many of the administrators in the education system, many professors of education, many teachers union officials, much of the NASA headquarters staff, etc. The Iron Law states that in every case the second group will gain and keep control of the organization. It will write the rules, and control promotions within the organization. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerry_Pournelle#Pournelle's_iron_law_of_bureaucracy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerry_Pournelle#Pournelle's_ir...

ohazi 5y ago

> I’m curious if anyone with insider information can speak to the possibility that this has happened in Boeing’s space division. s/in Boeing’s space division/at Boeing/ There's also the MCAS fiasco on the 737 MAX.

anonLL77 5y ago

Boeing is an engineering and manufacturing company, that is the culture. There are a lot of false narratives out there about Boeing's internal culture being a bunch of bean counters, etc. Of course there are pockets inside any large company that may not be ideal and mistakes are made in the development of any complex system. In my experience, however, Boeing is filled with dedicated engineering professionals trying to do the right thing in the face of increasing complexity. Sometimes there are structural problems in an organization and you get bad results despite everybody's best efforts. Boeing, like the government, has a lot of antiquated heavy weight processes that slow development down. As a field matures, it gets more complex, many past mistakes result in new processes to follow. Eventually, it is cruft that is difficult to remove and hard to navigate. Overtime, this increases development costs and slows projects down. Personally, probably the most difficult thing I've experienced is moving towards iterative processes (away from waterfall) and having a government customer wanting to support it but not really being able to. For example, if one were to begin to develop/evolve a complex system, the government about half way through would want a list of materials so they can be reviewed for a variety or purposes. Well, in an evolving system, this list is generally everchanging as people learn more about the domain and are able to make better choices over time. Something as simple as a list of materials can create all kinds of headaches. I could probably give a dozen or so examples where the government wants to, but cannot interface with modern engineering programs and practices. I also know that both the government and Boeing are trying to change, but it is difficult to change direction when so much of a large behemoth is made to work a certain way.

hinkley 5y ago
> Boeing is an engineering and manufacturing company, Boeing was an engineering and manufacturing company. Then they bought McDonnell Douglas but MD executives ended up in the management chain.

throwawaylinux 5y ago

Pournelle's Iron Law of Bureaucracy states that in any bureaucratic organization there will be two kinds of people: First, there will be those who are devoted to the goals of the organization. Examples are dedicated classroom teachers in an educational bureaucracy, many of the engineers and launch technicians and scientists at NASA, even some agricultural scientists and advisors in the former Soviet Union collective farming administration. Secondly, there will be those dedicated to the organization itself. Examples are many of the administrators in the education system, many professors of education, many teachers union officials, much of the NASA headquarters staff, etc. The Iron Law states that in every case the second group will gain and keep control of the organization. It will write the rules, and control promotions within the organization. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerry_Pournelle#Pournelle's_iron_law_of_bureaucracy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerry_Pournelle#Pournelle's_ir...