In (3), you're conflating "like" with "appears to me/us to be true". There are many things that appear to us to be true, but that which we don't like. (I'm sure

In (3), you're conflating "like" with "appears to me/us to be true". There are many things that appear to us to be true, but that which we don't like. (I'm sure many scientists who have banked their careers on various falsified theories will agree). So let's correct the argument from its straw-manned form: 1. Suppose scientific theory T is true. 2. If T is true, then S is also true. 3. But clearly it seems to both of us that S is not true. 4. Therefore, (1) is false. This sounds like a perfectly normal (and rational) scientific discourse. Problem for you: this sort of discourse also applies to moral theories as well. 1. Suppose moral theory T is true. 2. If T is true, then S is also true. 3. But clearly it seems to both of us that S is not true. 4. Therefore, (1) is false. Both are perfectly reasonable/rational sorts of discourses, because there are both moral facts and scientific facts, and the way that we come about both of them is ultimately rooted in appearances (whether those appearances be sense data or moral intuitions).