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> Eventually you are left relying on mere appearances. And of course that is rational. No, I am relying on a prediction of appearances. If I predict an instru
by Retric 5y ago
> Eventually you are left relying on mere appearances. And of course that is rational.
No, I am relying on a prediction of appearances. If I predict an instrument will show blue I don’t need to go through anything below that level. It’s now on someone else to make a different prediction and show new evidence.
> Contrast these two cases:
There is zero difference between them 2 + 2 = 5! could be true. 2 + 2 = 4 could be true, or they could both be false and 2 + 2 = 7.629.
We define math as things that follow from initial assumptions. 2 + 2 alone doesn’t have a definite answer, it only has a specific answer in a specific context. We generally don’t need to list the underlying assumptions to build a chain like 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4, but that’s simply based on an assumed context.
> 3 Empirical theories which make testable predictions are more likely to be true than empirical theories which can't.
Again no, being testable has nothing to do with being correct. Suppose I come up with a theory that has absolutely no direct or indirect impact on anyone or anything ever. Why exactly should we care about it?
Anyway, moral intuition isn’t a sensory perception. If I say “camp fire” you might remember warmth but you can’t avoid actually freezing from remembering fire. Similarly ask a cannibal their moral intuition around eating people and you don’t get the same responses where everyone could actually be burned by an actual fire.