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I see. My interpretation doesn't hold up given your definitions of back door. I bet the authorities would be happy with a surveillance mechanism disclosed in t
by laserlight 5y ago
I see. My interpretation doesn't hold up given your definitions of back door.
I bet the authorities would be happy with a surveillance mechanism disclosed in the EULA, though. Even if such a system is not technically a back door, I am opposed to it and would prefer Apple to oppose it.
Edit: I just noticed that you had already clarified your argument in other replies. I am sorry to make you repeat it.
- dwaite 5y agoIt has proven very difficult to oppose laws meant to deter child abuse and exploitation. Note that while the EFF's mission statement is about defending civil liberties, they posted two detailed articles about Apple's system without talking about the questionable parts of the underlying CSAM laws. There was nothing about how the laws negatively impact civil liberties and what the EFF might champion there. The problem is that the laws themselves are somewhat uniquely abusable and overreaching, but they are meant to help reduce a really grotesque problem - and reducing aspects like detection and reporting is not going to be as effective against the underlying societal issue. Apple has basically been fighting this for the 10 years since the introduction of iCloud Photo, saying they didn't have a way to balance the needs to detect CSAM material without impacting the privacy of the rest of users. PhotoDNA was already deployed at Microsoft and being deployed by third parties like Facebook when iCloud Photo launched. Now it appears that Apple was working a significant portion on that time toward trying to build a system that _did_ attempt to accomplish a balance between social/regulatory responsibility and privacy. But such a system has to prop technical systems and legal policies against one another to make up the shortcomings of each, which make it a very complex and nuanced system.