5 ms·

> The core problem here is that Apple is effectively putting code designed to inform the government of criminal activity on the device. It’s a bad precedent. T

> The core problem here is that Apple is effectively putting code designed to inform the government of criminal activity on the device. It’s a bad precedent. This is wildly disingenuous. Apple is putting code on the device which generates a hash, compares hashes, and creates a token out of that comparison. That is 100% of what happens on the device. Once the images and tokens are uploaded to iCloud photos, iCloud will alert if 30+ of those security tokens show a match, it will alert Apple's team, and they will get access to only those 30+ photos. They will manually review those photos, and if they then discover that you are indeed hoarding known child pornography then they report you to the authorities. Thus, it would be more accurate to say that apple is putting on your device code which can detect known child pornographic images. > And it feels like pure hypocrisy coming from a company whose CEO once claimed they couldn’t build surveillance features into their phones because of pressures for it to be abused. This isn't a surveillance feature. If you don't like it, disable iCloud Photos. Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side, but we'll have to see what this 'auditability' that he was talking about is all about. Honestly, with all of the hoops that Apple has jumped through to promote privacy, and to call out people who are violating privacy, it feels as though we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt at least until we have all the facts. At the moment, we have very few of the facts.

jchw 5y ago
Describing the implementation details does nothing to change the reality that the device is acting as an informant against its owner. The number of hoops literally changes nothing. Adding an AI model versus using SHA sums changes nothing. Adding some convoluted cryptography system to implement some additional policy changes nothing. In trivial cases like anti-piracy measures or anti-cheat in games, we tolerate that the device will sometimes act against our best interest, but at least in this case, the stakes are low and the intentions are transparent. We have every fact we need to know to know this shouldn’t be done, and I’m glad that privacy orgs like EFF have already spoken much to this effect.
feanaro 5y ago
> Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side, but we'll have to see what this 'auditability' that he was talking about is all about. Or we can just short circuit the entire issue by deciding firmly we don't want this and punish Apple's behaviour accordingly. Which is what appears to be happening. > it feels as though we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt It really doesn't feel like this to me at all. Users have clearly stated: we don't want this. It's time for Apple to simply pull it all back and apologize.
mensetmanusman 5y ago
They created a tool that, in principle, lets a government ask about certain hash matches that are on the iPhone but not necessarily on iCloud, correct? There is no way to determine whether the hashes are about CP or about HK protests.
spicybright 5y ago
> Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side, but... > ...we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt... You have to take off your apple branded rose tinted glasses my friend. Any company as big as apple needs to be scrutinized as harshly and critically as possible. Their influence on the world is so big that a botched roll out of this sort of tech could be absolutely devastating for so many people, for so many reasons. I don't care if it's hashed tokens or carrier pidgins. We should only allow companies to act in ways that improve our lives. Full stop.
insulanus 5y ago
> This isn't a surveillance feature. > Thus, it would be more accurate to say that apple is putting on your device code which can detect known child pornographic images > If you don't like it, disable iCloud Photos. > Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side [...] > [...] it feels as though we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt at least until we have all the facts. No, nobody gets "the benefit of the doubt". The very use of that phrase admits that you are being put into a situation where you could be screwed in the future. There is zero transparency or oversight into the code that does the scanning, the in-person review process, or the database of images being scanned for.
FireBeyond 5y ago
> Once the images and tokens are uploaded to iCloud photos, iCloud will alert if 30+ of those security tokens show a match, it will alert Apple's team, and they will get access to only those 30+ photos. They will manually review those photos, and if they then discover that you are indeed hoarding known child pornography then they report you to the authorities. Apple: We have 29 matches on your device of "known CSAM"[0]. However, despite our confidence level being very high, we won't report it to the authorities because we value your privacy! [0] for varying definitions of 'known CSAM'.

jchw 5y ago

Describing the implementation details does nothing to change the reality that the device is acting as an informant against its owner. The number of hoops literally changes nothing. Adding an AI model versus using SHA sums changes nothing. Adding some convoluted cryptography system to implement some additional policy changes nothing. In trivial cases like anti-piracy measures or anti-cheat in games, we tolerate that the device will sometimes act against our best interest, but at least in this case, the stakes are low and the intentions are transparent. We have every fact we need to know to know this shouldn’t be done, and I’m glad that privacy orgs like EFF have already spoken much to this effect.

feanaro 5y ago

> Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side, but we'll have to see what this 'auditability' that he was talking about is all about. Or we can just short circuit the entire issue by deciding firmly we don't want this and punish Apple's behaviour accordingly. Which is what appears to be happening. > it feels as though we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt It really doesn't feel like this to me at all. Users have clearly stated: we don't want this. It's time for Apple to simply pull it all back and apologize.

mensetmanusman 5y ago

They created a tool that, in principle, lets a government ask about certain hash matches that are on the iPhone but not necessarily on iCloud, correct? There is no way to determine whether the hashes are about CP or about HK protests.

spicybright 5y ago

> Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side, but... > ...we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt... You have to take off your apple branded rose tinted glasses my friend. Any company as big as apple needs to be scrutinized as harshly and critically as possible. Their influence on the world is so big that a botched roll out of this sort of tech could be absolutely devastating for so many people, for so many reasons. I don't care if it's hashed tokens or carrier pidgins. We should only allow companies to act in ways that improve our lives. Full stop.

insulanus 5y ago

> This isn't a surveillance feature. > Thus, it would be more accurate to say that apple is putting on your device code which can detect known child pornographic images > If you don't like it, disable iCloud Photos. > Yes, it could theoretically be abused if Apple went to the dark side [...] > [...] it feels as though we should give Apple the benefit of the doubt at least until we have all the facts. No, nobody gets "the benefit of the doubt". The very use of that phrase admits that you are being put into a situation where you could be screwed in the future. There is zero transparency or oversight into the code that does the scanning, the in-person review process, or the database of images being scanned for.

FireBeyond 5y ago

> Once the images and tokens are uploaded to iCloud photos, iCloud will alert if 30+ of those security tokens show a match, it will alert Apple's team, and they will get access to only those 30+ photos. They will manually review those photos, and if they then discover that you are indeed hoarding known child pornography then they report you to the authorities. Apple: We have 29 matches on your device of "known CSAM"[0]. However, despite our confidence level being very high, we won't report it to the authorities because we value your privacy! [0] for varying definitions of 'known CSAM'.