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> When you take a picture of your penis to send to your doctor and it accidentally syncs to iCloud and trips the CSAM alarms, will you get a warning before poli
by FabHK 5y ago
> When you take a picture of your penis to send to your doctor and it accidentally syncs to iCloud and trips the CSAM alarms, will you get a warning before police appear?
You would have to have not one, but N perceptual hash collisions with existing CSAM (where N is chosen such that the overall probability of that happening is vanishingly small). Then, there'd be human review. But no, presumably there won't be a warning.
> Will there be a whitelist to allow certain people to "opt-out for (national) security reasons" that regular people won't have access to or be able to confirm?
Everyone can opt out (for now at least) by disabling iCloud syncing. (You could sync to another cloud service, but chances are that then they're scanned there.)
Beyond that, it would be good if Apple built it verifiably identically across jurisdictions. (If you think that Apple creates malicious iOS updates targeting specific people, then you have more to worry about than this new feature.)
> How can we know this won't be used against journalists and opponents of those in power, like every other invasive system that purports to provide "authorized governments with technology that helps them combat terror and crime[1]".
By ensuring that a) the used hash database is verifiably identical across jurisdictions, and b) notifications go only to that US NGO. Would be nice if Apple could open source that part of the iOS, but unless one could somehow verify that that's what's running on the device, I don't see how that would alleviate the concerns.
- washadjeffmad 5y agoThat isn't an offer of legal protections or guarantees that the trustworthiness and accuracy of their methods can be verified in court. It really doesn't matter how they do it now that we know that iOS has vulnerabilities that allow remote monitoring and control of someone's device to the extent that it created a market for at least one espionage tool that has lead to the deaths of innocent people. I remember when the popular way to shut down small forums, business competitors, or get embarrassing information taken off the web was to anonymously upload CP to it and then report it, repeatedly. With this, what's to stop virtual "SWATing" of Apple customers? Not necessarily just those whose Apple products have been compromised, whose iClouds have been compromised, or who are the victims of hash collisions (see any group of non-CSAM images that CSAM detection flags). Will Apple analyze all hardware to ensure no innocent person is framed because of an undisclosed vulnerability? What checks are being offered on this notoriously burdensome process on the accused? >If you think that Apple creates malicious iOS updates targeting specific people, then you have more to worry about than this new feature Oof. Good point.