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The design more plausible enables total device surveillance than questionable iCloud Backups. (I refuse to call a backdoored setup E2EE)
by zionic 5y ago
The design more plausible enables total device surveillance than questionable iCloud Backups. (I refuse to call a backdoored setup E2EE)
- zepto 5y agoThat’s silly. The design is so narrowly tailored to scan for CSAM that nobody can use it for anything else.
- FabHK 5y agoIt all depends on what perceptual hashes you use. If Apple can institute a process whereby those are tied to the OS version, but not to the region, then it would be impossible to impose jurisdiction-specific exceptions.
- zepto 5y ago> It all depends on what perceptual hashes you use. I’m talking about the mechanism as described, not a hypothetical. > If Apple can institute a process whereby those are tied to the OS version, but not to the region, then it would be impossible to impose jurisdiction-specific exceptions. As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction.
- FabHK 5y ago> As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction. That is very worrisome. How do they want to withstand political pressure then to make the database of "bad hashes" dependent on the jurisdiction if they've already made the feature dependent on the jurisdiction?
- zepto 5y agoPresumably they’ll just say, we built a child abuse prevention mechanism and we have no intention of using it for anything else.
- fsflover 5y ago> As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction. How do you know? I think it's just implemented in the US. Nothing stops Apple to implement it elsewhere.
- shuckles 5y agoThey have said the mechanism is global in both their FAQ and in an interview with Tech Crunch. They have no way to target a database to a region or device.