> With its on-device CSAM scanner, Apple has built a tool carefully calibrated to protect user privacy. If building this tool enabled Apple to finally offer bro

> With its on-device CSAM scanner, Apple has built a tool carefully calibrated to protect user privacy. If building this tool enabled Apple to finally offer broader encryption of iCloud data, it might even be a net increase in user privacy. > But tools are neither good nor evil. Apple has built this tool for a good purpose, but every time a new tool is built, all of us need to imagine how it might be misused. Apple seems to have very carefully designed this feature to make it more difficult to subvert, but that’s not always enough. > Imagine a case where a law enforcement agency in a foreign country comes to Apple and says that it has compiled a database of illegal images and wants it added to Apple’s scanner. Apple has said, bluntly, that it will refuse all such requests. That’s encouraging, and I have little doubt that Apple would abandon most countries if they tried to pull that maneuver. > But would it be able to say no to China? Would it be able to say no to the U.S. government if the images in question would implicate members of terrorist organizations? And in a decade or two, will policies like this be so commonplace that when the moment comes that a government asks Apple or its equivalents to began scanning for illegal or subversive material, will anyone notice? The first implementation of this technology is to stop CSAM, and nobody will argue against trying to stop the exploitation of children. But will there be a second implementation? A third? I’ll add this: Is our outrage at Apple enough to stop governments from requiring that they implement features like this?