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I think the problem is you're assuming that general AI = Turing machine, but there's no indication that needs to be the case. "General AI" to me means human in
by vlovich123 5y ago
I think the problem is you're assuming that general AI = Turing machine, but there's no indication that needs to be the case.
"General AI" to me means human intelligence running on an artificial system (silicon, simulated brain, etc), so the optimization I'm thinking of is more akin to having an assembly expert translate your code into assembly than a compiler optimization pass.
Given that I have optimized my fair bit of code by removing abstraction layers or simplifying code, by definition a general AI should be similarly capable & can handle even ambiguous tasks like "refactor this codebase in this way". Obviously this gives up accuracy, but humans make mistakes writing code as well & it would be much easier to say "I've observed a fault that has this properties. Figure out the problem". It should do an even better job than I can on problems like that because for complicated problems it should be able to follow complex codebases with greater ease than I.
Again, I'm defining a tautological definition of "general AI" as one that's capable of doing all that. If it's not capable of doing that then it's not general AI.
- adrianN 5y agoHumans can't solve the halting problem either, there is no contradiction. The halting problem is a theoretical problem that needn't apply in real life. If you for example restrict your AI to be able to generate optimal assembly for all programs that don't require more than 100PB of source code to write down, the halting problem no longer applies (in fact you can now implement this AI using a regular expression).
- tsimionescu 5y agoI understand your points, but it's important to understand that humans ARE Turing Machines. We don't know of anything that CAN be computed bit can't be computed by a Turing Machine, so General AI would be a Turing Machine. The Turing Machine model is specifically designed to abstract what a human (mathematician) does: you have a notebook (tape) and some kind of working memory inside your head, and at any one time you can either read something from the notebook and change the state in your head, or you can write something new in the notebook. This is what a TM does - it is an extremely abstract description of what it means to think, basically.
- vlovich123 5y agoThe problem for me with that line of reasoning is that it's one based on philosophy & not mathematically proven or with any clear evidence. For example, [1], [2], [3] all show there are classes of computation outside of Turing machines. So if we agree there are computations outside of Turing machines, then the question is where does the human brain fall and, relatedly, can non-Turing machines run Turing machines? I suspect the answer to the latter question must be yes given the simplicity of a Turing machine (i.e. a pen & pencil is sufficient). Thus, the fact that a human can execute a Turing machine doesn't conclude anything meaningful to me. If you could show that a Turing machine can execute a human brain, then the human brain would 100% be a Turing machine since a core property of a Turing machine is that it can transfer to any other Turing machine. Even if we build "general AI" on a Turing machine, all we've shown is that there is a class of intelligence that is at its core a complicated Turing machine. It might suggest that a human brain is also a Turing machine (& I'd shift the weight of my prior from let's say 30% we're not Turing machines to 70% we are), but I think the only way to definitively prove that would be to do so by mathematically proving the model of the human brain, and then maybe also using it to actually clone a human brain onto a Turing machine to prove the model correct. I think until that happens the argument remains philosophical & whichever side you take to be uninteresting. The only purpose of the debate is to show the question itself is important. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation [2] http://faculty.poly.edu/~jbain/physinfocomp/Readings/94Hogarth.pdf http://faculty.poly.edu/~jbain/physinfocomp/Readings/94Hogar... [3] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304397503006352 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030439750...
- tsimionescu 5y agoI do not have access to the third paper, which may hold somewhat more interest. Otherwise, all examples of models of hypercomputation in [1] and [2] are relying on performing an infinite number of steps in a finite time OR on precisely knowing the solution to an uncomputable problem. These are as interesting as trying to solve human flight assuming anti-gravity exists - they are obviously non-physical, absurdist models. In fact, we don't know of a single physical process that is not Turing Computable, at least if we add randomness. Even with quantum wave-function collapse, we already know that QCs are still Turing equivalent. This all suggests to me that the prior for the human mind being Turing equivalent can only be taken to be very close to 1.