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Checking for CSAM isn't the issue. The issue is that Apple's system design easily extends to checking all sorts of other things - political dissidents, journali

Checking for CSAM isn't the issue. The issue is that Apple's system design easily extends to checking all sorts of other things - political dissidents, journalists, etc. Not only that, it commits a felony when it transmits found CSAM to a party other than NCMEC (i.e. Apple itself).

shuckles 5y ago
Scanning all your photos in the cloud easily extends to checking all sorts of other things as well.
- euphoria83 5y ago
  It does. However people have a greater expectation of privacy on a device they own than on a cloud-based solution where they have voluntarily uploaded content.
  - shuckles 5y ago
    Good thing the device only does this as part of voluntarily uploading the photo to a cloud based solution.
    - deleted 5y ago
      [deleted]
  - mvanbaak 5y ago
    The scanning only takes place if you enable icloud libraries. Your phone and photos app ask for this and you have to accept it before it is enabled. Sounds voluntarily to me.
robertoandred 5y ago
Apple’s system design does not easily extend to checking vague subject matter. Every step of the process is tied to hashes of specific photographs. And do you seriously think they didn’t check the legality of what they built? Really?
- mrathys 5y ago
  That is not correct. They are algorithms that detect photos that resemble specific photographs.
  - robertoandred 5y ago
    “Resemble”, in the same way that a cropped photo resembles the uncropped original.
    - simion314 5y ago
      And in the same way a human resembles a butterfly. didn't you learn from the case where algorithms matched white noise with some copyright material? There are many iPhones and many images in each iPhones, there will be false matches. Add on top of that that the database of hashes is secret, that it can be updated in secret, that the algorithm is secret and the "threshold" is also secret and you have a lot of suspicion from people.
      - robertoandred 5y ago
        No, not in the way a human resembles a butterfly. But for the sake of argument, fine: some pictures of you look exactly like pictures of a butterfly, enough to trigger the flagging threshold. These false positives would easily be caught during the review and nothing would happen.
        simion314 5y ago
        I do not trust the review people, they are not even Apple employees, they are cheap contractors that hire cheap labor,this people are treated like crap so I can see them making mistakes , is not like you never heard of Apple review guy decided X and when other guy checked he decided !X .
- TimTheTinker 5y ago
  > specific photographs That's the catch. Nothing in the system design prevents them from adding hashes of other types of photographs to that database. > And do you seriously think they didn’t check the legality of what they built? IANAL, but the law clearly states that transmitting CSAM to any party other than NCMEC is a felony. Apple != NCMEC. More info: https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/929-One-Bad-Apple.html https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/929-On...
eddyg 5y ago
> For the conspiracy to work, it'd need Apple, NCMEC and DOJ working together to pull it off voluntarily and it to never leak. If that's your threat model, OK, but that's a huge conspiracy with enormous risk to all participants. Worth reading: https://pingthread.com/thread/1424873629003702273 https://pingthread.com/thread/1424873629003702273
- TimTheTinker 5y ago
  My threat model right now is to trust no one except (1) people I know personally, (2) people they know and trust personally, (3) people who have proved their reputation for integrity publicly, and (4) well-designed systems built by either (1), (2), or (3). I know someone at Apple who knows their head of privacy... so #2 may be in question, given the design of this system and its capability of further compromising the privacy of millions of Chinese citizens on the Chinese government's whim (and any other strongly-authoritarian government).
Spooky23 5y ago
A few years ago, the hysterical nerd privacy crowd was clutching pearls and waving hands because Condolezza Rice was going to turn you Dropbox files over the the NSA.

shuckles 5y ago

Scanning all your photos in the cloud easily extends to checking all sorts of other things as well.

euphoria83 5y ago
It does. However people have a greater expectation of privacy on a device they own than on a cloud-based solution where they have voluntarily uploaded content.
- shuckles 5y ago
  Good thing the device only does this as part of voluntarily uploading the photo to a cloud based solution.
  - deleted 5y ago
    [deleted]
- mvanbaak 5y ago
  The scanning only takes place if you enable icloud libraries. Your phone and photos app ask for this and you have to accept it before it is enabled. Sounds voluntarily to me.

robertoandred 5y ago

Apple’s system design does not easily extend to checking vague subject matter. Every step of the process is tied to hashes of specific photographs. And do you seriously think they didn’t check the legality of what they built? Really?

mrathys 5y ago
That is not correct. They are algorithms that detect photos that resemble specific photographs.
- robertoandred 5y ago
  “Resemble”, in the same way that a cropped photo resembles the uncropped original.
  - simion314 5y ago
    And in the same way a human resembles a butterfly. didn't you learn from the case where algorithms matched white noise with some copyright material? There are many iPhones and many images in each iPhones, there will be false matches. Add on top of that that the database of hashes is secret, that it can be updated in secret, that the algorithm is secret and the "threshold" is also secret and you have a lot of suspicion from people.
    - robertoandred 5y ago
      No, not in the way a human resembles a butterfly. But for the sake of argument, fine: some pictures of you look exactly like pictures of a butterfly, enough to trigger the flagging threshold. These false positives would easily be caught during the review and nothing would happen.
      - simion314 5y ago
        I do not trust the review people, they are not even Apple employees, they are cheap contractors that hire cheap labor,this people are treated like crap so I can see them making mistakes , is not like you never heard of Apple review guy decided X and when other guy checked he decided !X .
TimTheTinker 5y ago
> specific photographs That's the catch. Nothing in the system design prevents them from adding hashes of other types of photographs to that database. > And do you seriously think they didn’t check the legality of what they built? IANAL, but the law clearly states that transmitting CSAM to any party other than NCMEC is a felony. Apple != NCMEC. More info: https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/929-One-Bad-Apple.html https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/929-On...

eddyg 5y ago

> For the conspiracy to work, it'd need Apple, NCMEC and DOJ working together to pull it off voluntarily and it to never leak. If that's your threat model, OK, but that's a huge conspiracy with enormous risk to all participants. Worth reading: https://pingthread.com/thread/1424873629003702273 https://pingthread.com/thread/1424873629003702273

TimTheTinker 5y ago
My threat model right now is to trust no one except (1) people I know personally, (2) people they know and trust personally, (3) people who have proved their reputation for integrity publicly, and (4) well-designed systems built by either (1), (2), or (3). I know someone at Apple who knows their head of privacy... so #2 may be in question, given the design of this system and its capability of further compromising the privacy of millions of Chinese citizens on the Chinese government's whim (and any other strongly-authoritarian government).

Spooky23 5y ago

A few years ago, the hysterical nerd privacy crowd was clutching pearls and waving hands because Condolezza Rice was going to turn you Dropbox files over the the NSA.