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Disappearing messages by default could further weaken social protections. Police and authorities can have logs (either of everyone or high value targets) and t
by londons_explore 5y ago
Disappearing messages by default could further weaken social protections.
Police and authorities can have logs (either of everyone or high value targets) and those people won't have access to their own messages to defend themselves.
It even means chat conversations can be entirely fabricated by one side, and the other has no way to refute it.
- tablespoon 5y ago> Disappearing messages by default could further weaken social protections. > Police and authorities can have logs (either of everyone or high value targets) and those people won't have access to their own messages to defend themselves. > It even means chat conversations can be entirely fabricated by one side, and the other has no way to refute it. I don't think that's a realistic threat, and if it was, the defense you propose wouldn't work. Given that Signal is E2E encrypted, I don't see the mechanism where the police and authorities could even have logs without compromising the endpoints. Furthermore, even if they did fabricate a message, it's not like your phone is some inviolable log of what you actually sent. Even with Signal today, you can delete messages on an ah-hoc basis, so their rebuttal (that you sent it but deleted it from your phone) would be exactly the same.
- tialaramex 5y ago> it's not like your phone is some inviolable log of what you actually sent. In some systems, e.g. PGP, messages are digitally signed. This means when I send you a PGP mail, I'm actually providing proof - which anybody can verify - that I really sent that email. If what you wanted the message platform for was to agree legal contracts maybe that feels like a reasonable structure. Alice sends Bob a PGP mail "I agree to X" and Bob now has a signed message proving this agreement. Bob couldn't have faked that, only Alice could have signed it. Signal deliberately doesn't do that. Signal messages have cryptographic integrity protection (so Charlie can't send Bob a message pretending to be from Alice) but not signatures, so Bob can fake messages from Alice to Bob because Bob is a participant and so has the keys. As a result Bob knows if the messages are fake or real, but can't prove that to anybody else. That feels much more like what you want from a platform you use to chat with people, not for making legal contracts.
- upofadown 5y agoSignal messages are effectively signed as part of the protocol. Signal releases data to allow your correspondent to forge that signature after they have received your message. Then you have to attempt to claim a forgery in a system specifically designed to allow such a claim. PGP does the identity verification out of band. So you can simply not sign your message and completely eliminate the problem in the first place. So it seems odd to suggest that PGP is inferior to what Signal does. >This means when I send you a PGP mail, I'm actually providing proof - which anybody can verify - that I really sent that email. PGP prevents access to signature information with the encryption. So you would need access to the private key of the person I sent the message to before you can verify my signature.
- tialaramex 5y ago> Signal messages are effectively signed as part of the protocol What is the word "effectively" doing in your sentence? I suggest that the word you needed is in fact just not. The messages can be authenticated but they are not signed. > Signal releases data to allow your correspondent to forge that signature after they have received your message. Nope. Bob always has the ability to produce forged messages apparently from Alice (or Charlie) to Bob. What may have confused you is that Signal can eventually send Bob's expired authentication keys in cleartext. At this point any eavesdropper could make forged messages from somebody to Bob, that seem authentic to anybody except Bob (and presumably whoever didn't actually send them) but are rather old news. > PGP does the identity verification out of band. So you can simply not sign your message and completely eliminate the problem in the first place. In this case your message can't be authenticated, a very different scenario. Now Bob can't tell if this PGP email is really even from Alice because it lacks a signature. Perhaps useful for an anonymous tips line or something, but rarely what we want for messaging. > PGP prevents access to signature information with the encryption. So you would need access to the private key of the person I sent the message to before you can verify my signature. Nope. Just need the signed message. If the message was also encrypted then its recipient can decrypt it and show the decrypted but still signed message to other people as proof of what was sent, without revealing their private key. This is very often undesirable, and yet it's the only option provided in PGP.
- godelski 5y agoOn the other hand, disappearing messages by default could strengthen social protections. Someone gets hit by a hack like Pegasas and it is only able to scrape a small history of messages. At the end of the day this is going to be a per user decision. Security and privacy are different things. What's the correct privacy options for you is going to be different from another person, while we are likely to share the same optimal security strategy.