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The miners, collectively, is also the group with the power to hard fork or not. So in some sense, they're the ruling class and the core developers are just prop

The miners, collectively, is also the group with the power to hard fork or not. So in some sense, they're the ruling class and the core developers are just proposing the changes to them.

Taek 5y ago
This is a general misconception about how consensus works in blockchains. Miners can choose whether or not to adopt a "soft fork". A soft fork can't violate any existing rules, it can just introduce new rules. A hard fork is allowed to violate existing rules, and gives you more flexibility in what can be changed. And miners do not have the power to decide whether or not a hard fork will happen. A hard fork is determined by the users, who have to upgrade their software. If the software updates automatically, then the power of hard forking lies with the developers, who could just push the new code out via an automatic update.
- nearbuy 5y ago
  Ah, I should have known better. I was misinterpreting from the article linked in the article where it says (about a fork), "Miners, exchanges, and node operators also had to agree to update their software."
  - noxer 5y ago
    The reality is that people sit together and try to make a deal that all parties agree on simply because disruption and uncertainty is not in the interests of any of the parties. This doesn't change the fact that the parties do not have aligned interests and therefore its a constant fight everything is slow and expensive because of that. Kinda funny how this problem was solved before ETH even existed simply by removing the incentive for the hardware operator. No block rewards and no fees to collect aka no reason to fight over it. The only people who run the hardware without getting paid for it are the people who want to use it. They have aligned interest like a fast and cheap network and fast update cycles. And ofc no one who has to pay for the hardware and energy has any interest in PoW.
  - shawnz 5y ago
    It is necessary for some miners to choose to use the post-fork software in order for it to work, but miners take on the task of mining due to financial incentives, and the users ultimately control those incentives. Miners only have a choice in the sense that they could collectively choose to abandon their profits as a matter of principle.
- silasdavis 5y ago
  The miners do have the power to hard fork - they can choose to run a node that implements the fork > A hard fork is determined by the users, who have to upgrade their software. Who are 'the users' here? Light clients? Users of wallets? None of these have the power to adopt a fork, soft or hard. The collective action of the miners (or validators) defines which chains still retain liveness. For example in the hard fork between Ethereum Classic (ETC) and Ethereum (ETH) ETC was able to exist only because miners chose to to mine it. This in turn did give non-mining users the choice of how to distribute their demand and create extrinsic value for the ETC token. I wouldn't say this gives non-mining users any control over a hard fork since it happens after-the-fact. > If the software updates automatically, then the power of hard forking lies with the developers I don't know of a node distribution for Ethereum that works this way. The core developers have power as in knowledge and power as in authority, the later being the traditional form of political power.
  - Taek 5y ago
    Anyone who runs a full node can decide any set of rules they want to follow. You can incentivize miners to mine on your fork by providing block rewards. If you pay people to do something, at least some of them will. The ETC fork would have been successful at any non-zero support level from people with the ability to mine. And since any CPU can mine (just inefficiently), any fork can get a mining baseline. That may not give you a ton of security but it works. People who run full nodes are the ones that decide hard forks.
    - silasdavis 5y ago
      Thanks for responding. So you are saying full nodes are the users? They can provide connectivity but full nodes that don't mine can't continue a fork (where fork is any fork including the original) without there being people willing to mine that fork. So that's why I think miners have the ability to fork. > The ETC fork would have been successful at any non-zero support level from people with the ability to mine. It would be economically irrational for people to send transactions to a fork with a single miner since that miner could unilaterally rewrite any transactions as they see fit. This is why I think miners have the ability to control forking.
- noxer 5y ago
  Not correct. The software update that goes to the uses but if miners dont mine for the hard fork, then the user cant use it. Its a technical reality that they could update anyway and at least some miners would mine for them but that would just be causing a chain fork and 2 different chains. The miners have the power to decide where they mine. And user have the power to decide on which chain they operate on. They both have power with their choice. But the choice for user is limited to chains that actually exist. For for now only ETH and ETC exists but if there is demand for more chains because a significant portion of people disagree with the progress then more chains can fork off. This however requires miners who are willing to mine on a forked chain. The power is split but the constant "fights" between the different parties (miners/users) is the reasons these fist-gen (PoW/PoS) blockchains can not be efficient. There is and forever will be a misaligned interest between the two parties which drives up prices and slows down progress. Software's auto-update feature is completely irrelevant to consensus. It obviously does not define who has the power at all. To update is always voluntary. Software devs dont technically have any power they have influence.
  - Taek 5y ago
    Any chain can exist with a single miner on it, and anyone can be that miner. Users do not need the consent of miners to execute a hardfork and migrate to a new chain. Miners do not control or determine hard forks. This has been demonstrated empirically numerous times in crypto history, most notably the moment that >80% of the hashrate openly supported a hardfork that subsequently failed because it did not have user support. Your node software decides what fork you run on. If someone can push an update to your software without your consent, they can choose to put you on a fork and you may not even realize it happened. This is why most full node software (including bitcoin and Ethereum) does not support automatic updates.
    - noxer 5y ago
      https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28142675 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28142675
  - shawnz 5y ago
    > The software update that goes to the uses but if miners dont mine for the hard fork, then the user cant use it. ... The miners have the power to decide where they mine. This is based on the assumption that miners would rather choose to abandon their business as a matter of principle than mine on the most profitable chain, and also somehow convince any future, unaffiliated prospective miners to also do the same. How could they ever achieve that? Miners don't control where the financial incentives are.

The miners, collectively, is also the group with the power to hard fork or not. So in some sense, they're the ruling class and the core developers are just proposing the changes to them.

Taek 5y ago

This is a general misconception about how consensus works in blockchains. Miners can choose whether or not to adopt a "soft fork". A soft fork can't violate any existing rules, it can just introduce new rules. A hard fork is allowed to violate existing rules, and gives you more flexibility in what can be changed. And miners do not have the power to decide whether or not a hard fork will happen. A hard fork is determined by the users, who have to upgrade their software. If the software updates automatically, then the power of hard forking lies with the developers, who could just push the new code out via an automatic update.

nearbuy 5y ago
Ah, I should have known better. I was misinterpreting from the article linked in the article where it says (about a fork), "Miners, exchanges, and node operators also had to agree to update their software."
- noxer 5y ago
  The reality is that people sit together and try to make a deal that all parties agree on simply because disruption and uncertainty is not in the interests of any of the parties. This doesn't change the fact that the parties do not have aligned interests and therefore its a constant fight everything is slow and expensive because of that. Kinda funny how this problem was solved before ETH even existed simply by removing the incentive for the hardware operator. No block rewards and no fees to collect aka no reason to fight over it. The only people who run the hardware without getting paid for it are the people who want to use it. They have aligned interest like a fast and cheap network and fast update cycles. And ofc no one who has to pay for the hardware and energy has any interest in PoW.
- shawnz 5y ago
  It is necessary for some miners to choose to use the post-fork software in order for it to work, but miners take on the task of mining due to financial incentives, and the users ultimately control those incentives. Miners only have a choice in the sense that they could collectively choose to abandon their profits as a matter of principle.
silasdavis 5y ago
The miners do have the power to hard fork - they can choose to run a node that implements the fork > A hard fork is determined by the users, who have to upgrade their software. Who are 'the users' here? Light clients? Users of wallets? None of these have the power to adopt a fork, soft or hard. The collective action of the miners (or validators) defines which chains still retain liveness. For example in the hard fork between Ethereum Classic (ETC) and Ethereum (ETH) ETC was able to exist only because miners chose to to mine it. This in turn did give non-mining users the choice of how to distribute their demand and create extrinsic value for the ETC token. I wouldn't say this gives non-mining users any control over a hard fork since it happens after-the-fact. > If the software updates automatically, then the power of hard forking lies with the developers I don't know of a node distribution for Ethereum that works this way. The core developers have power as in knowledge and power as in authority, the later being the traditional form of political power.
- Taek 5y ago
  Anyone who runs a full node can decide any set of rules they want to follow. You can incentivize miners to mine on your fork by providing block rewards. If you pay people to do something, at least some of them will. The ETC fork would have been successful at any non-zero support level from people with the ability to mine. And since any CPU can mine (just inefficiently), any fork can get a mining baseline. That may not give you a ton of security but it works. People who run full nodes are the ones that decide hard forks.
  - silasdavis 5y ago
    Thanks for responding. So you are saying full nodes are the users? They can provide connectivity but full nodes that don't mine can't continue a fork (where fork is any fork including the original) without there being people willing to mine that fork. So that's why I think miners have the ability to fork. > The ETC fork would have been successful at any non-zero support level from people with the ability to mine. It would be economically irrational for people to send transactions to a fork with a single miner since that miner could unilaterally rewrite any transactions as they see fit. This is why I think miners have the ability to control forking.
noxer 5y ago
Not correct. The software update that goes to the uses but if miners dont mine for the hard fork, then the user cant use it. Its a technical reality that they could update anyway and at least some miners would mine for them but that would just be causing a chain fork and 2 different chains. The miners have the power to decide where they mine. And user have the power to decide on which chain they operate on. They both have power with their choice. But the choice for user is limited to chains that actually exist. For for now only ETH and ETC exists but if there is demand for more chains because a significant portion of people disagree with the progress then more chains can fork off. This however requires miners who are willing to mine on a forked chain. The power is split but the constant "fights" between the different parties (miners/users) is the reasons these fist-gen (PoW/PoS) blockchains can not be efficient. There is and forever will be a misaligned interest between the two parties which drives up prices and slows down progress. Software's auto-update feature is completely irrelevant to consensus. It obviously does not define who has the power at all. To update is always voluntary. Software devs dont technically have any power they have influence.
- Taek 5y ago
  Any chain can exist with a single miner on it, and anyone can be that miner. Users do not need the consent of miners to execute a hardfork and migrate to a new chain. Miners do not control or determine hard forks. This has been demonstrated empirically numerous times in crypto history, most notably the moment that >80% of the hashrate openly supported a hardfork that subsequently failed because it did not have user support. Your node software decides what fork you run on. If someone can push an update to your software without your consent, they can choose to put you on a fork and you may not even realize it happened. This is why most full node software (including bitcoin and Ethereum) does not support automatic updates.
  - noxer 5y ago
    https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28142675 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28142675
- shawnz 5y ago
  > The software update that goes to the uses but if miners dont mine for the hard fork, then the user cant use it. ... The miners have the power to decide where they mine. This is based on the assumption that miners would rather choose to abandon their business as a matter of principle than mine on the most profitable chain, and also somehow convince any future, unaffiliated prospective miners to also do the same. How could they ever achieve that? Miners don't control where the financial incentives are.