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In my case it is to a large degree because I don't care. Disappearing messages are to prevent my kids reading the messages between me and their mother ;-) If

In my case it is to a large degree because I don't care. Disappearing messages are to prevent my kids reading the messages between me and their mother ;-) If NSA actually read my messages that would be kind of funny. If they have such a hack I'm sure they won't spend it on me or any other Joe Sixpack. Maybe ФСБ reads it but I have a hard time believing that too. My threat model consists of (not in any particular order): - my kids, - random internet strangers, - Facebook (who'll sell you to whoever pays), - Google or a Google-like entity with runaway "AI" and arrogant customer support[1] (who can lock out from my accounts for no reason) Besides, despite all the talk about E2E-encryption being so important, Signal (which I cheer for) IIRC has had a nasty XSS-exploit in their desktop allowing remote control of the pc, their phone client has been sending pictures to others than the recipient and probably a couple more. Ad I and others have pointed out repeatedly: There is more to security than encryption. It doesn't matter if it is E2E-encrypted if it is delivered to the wrong contact. And it doesn't matter if it is E2E-encrypted if whoever knows the secret can send you a specially crafted message and take control over your machine. [1]: I originally wrote employees but I don't think the average Google employee is more arrogant than others, they just come across that way because of policies created far above them.

lmm 5y ago
Secure systems are all alike; every insecure system is insecure in its own way. A messenger that has E2E encryption might not be secure, but a messenger that doesn't have E2E encryption is definitely insecure. Not caring about your messages being read, or being willing to trust the operator of the service, is fine, but in that case I struggle to see why you'd pick Telegram, given that their whole selling point was about privacy and encryption when their encryption didn't actually work.
- afiori 5y ago
  > when their encryption didn't actually work. what are referring to here? I vaguely know about delivery bugs and protocol patches
  - lmm 5y ago
    The initial release used a homegrown crypto protocol with serious weaknesses, and the developer at least initially doubled down and tried to defend it.
    - afiori 5y ago
      thanks, good to know
      - skinkestek 5y ago
        Just as long as one remembers that this was the first release of Telegram and that WhatsApp ran not weakly encrypted but actually unencrypted until about a year before these events ;-) I don't defend Telegrams history when it comes to crypto,just pointing out that there are massive double standards here: - WhatsApp is the good one (sending data unencrypted until 2012, and to add insult to injury they sent it on port 443) - Telegram is the bad guy (sent data encrypted but used a dodgy algorithm early on)
        lmm 5y ago
        Encryption is one of those things where no algorithm is better than a bad algorithm - if you know your data is being sent in the clear then you can at least act appropriately. And the attitude of the Telegram developers when they were called out is particularly concerning.
        skinkestek 5y ago
        > Encryption is one of those things where no algorithm is better than a bad algorithm Absolutely not universally true: Encryption that protect against everyone except NSA is still infinitely much better than sending plaintext. Internet banking can't work with plaintext. It can work perfectly fine even if everyone knows NSA could break it.
- skinkestek 5y ago
  > A messenger that has E2E encryption might not be secure, but a messenger that doesn't have E2E encryption is definitely insecure. It is secure for my purposes. Throwing away threat models and the meaning of secure and encrypted just to be able to define something that competes for attention as "not secure" and "not encrypted" (from other threads) isn't very high level, it is basic framing. edit: > Not caring about your messages being read, or being willing to trust the operator of the service, is fine, but in that case I struggle to see why you'd pick Telegram, given that their whole selling point was about privacy and encryption when their encryption didn't actually work. Remember, when Telegram came around WhatsApp was un-encrypted. Not point-to-point encrypted, just encoded. You didn't need to know or crack a key, you just needed toknow the protocol. Also, the main selling point of Telegram as I remember it wasn't security, it was dumb IMO, it was "we will be free (no cost) forever while WhatsApp is going to charge you money". Finally it isn't that I don't care if my messages are read, K just cannot care if my messages are read by NSA or FSB. If they go after me nothing will stop them.
  - lmm 5y ago
    > Throwing away threat models and the meaning of secure and encrypted just to be able to define something that competes for attention as "not secure" and "not encrypted" (from other threads) isn't very high level, it is basic framing. It's basic, but it's valid. I was responding to all your "It doesn't matter if it is E2E-encrypted if xyz" points, which are faulty logic; if whether it's E2E-encrypted matters in your threat model, then whether it's E2E-encrypted still matters in your threat model even if other aspects of the system are secure. > Remember, when Telegram came around WhatsApp was un-encrypted. Not point-to-point encrypted, just encoded. You didn't need to know or crack a key, you just needed toknow the protocol. Citation? I don't remember it happening that way at all; Telegram marketed themselves by attacking WhatsApp on a couple of minor vulnerabilities in side features like video handling (which was legitimate in some ways, but extremely hypocritical given the bigger weaknesses in Telegram's own implementation). If message text was readable that would have been a much bigger deal.
    - skinkestek 5y ago
      > It's basic, but it's valid. I wrote basic framing. It is a valid and effective marketing technique but not something you should rely on in a technical discussion. > if whether it's E2E-encrypted matters in your threat model, then whether it's E2E-encrypted still matters in your threat model even if other aspects of the system are secure. Then we agree :-) I've been communicating over email, irc and lots of other channels that were not E2E-encrypted for years and I still have to. I'll have to live with the fact that my bank, my government and a number of others have unencrypted, realtime access to far more sensitive data than Telegram. The fact that someone can read my Telegram messages consisting of perfectly innocent photos is way down on my list as long as they who do it has a lot to lose by doing it ;-) (I.e. if you had access it would be a problem. If any serious agency has access they will never use it against me because then they give away that they have the capability. In the same way Telegram has everything to lose by letting employees snoop. Same as Google: I do not fear them snooping my mail, I fear their AI will kill my account and no one will tell me why.) > Citation? I don't remember it happening that way at all; Telegram marketed themselves by attacking WhatsApp on a couple of minor vulnerabilities in side features like video handling (which was legitimate in some ways, but extremely hypocritical given the bigger weaknesses in Telegram's own implementation). If message text was readable that would have been a much bigger deal. I've followed Telegram quite closely so I am fairly certain about their marketing message early on. As you can see it also put them in a bad light so thats something too. I've been unable to find references for the point about just being encoded, not encrypted so take that with a grain of salt for now. Some evidence can probably be found in an old unofficial client repo or someone who wrote one of those can confirm. I might be wrong but remember this was back in 2009. It was a whole different world back then. I used and liked WhatsApp despite all this because just like with Telegram perfect security didn't matter for the kind of communication I have on messengers back then either.

lmm 5y ago

Secure systems are all alike; every insecure system is insecure in its own way. A messenger that has E2E encryption might not be secure, but a messenger that doesn't have E2E encryption is definitely insecure. Not caring about your messages being read, or being willing to trust the operator of the service, is fine, but in that case I struggle to see why you'd pick Telegram, given that their whole selling point was about privacy and encryption when their encryption didn't actually work.

afiori 5y ago
> when their encryption didn't actually work. what are referring to here? I vaguely know about delivery bugs and protocol patches
- lmm 5y ago
  The initial release used a homegrown crypto protocol with serious weaknesses, and the developer at least initially doubled down and tried to defend it.
  - afiori 5y ago
    thanks, good to know
    - skinkestek 5y ago
      Just as long as one remembers that this was the first release of Telegram and that WhatsApp ran not weakly encrypted but actually unencrypted until about a year before these events ;-) I don't defend Telegrams history when it comes to crypto,just pointing out that there are massive double standards here: - WhatsApp is the good one (sending data unencrypted until 2012, and to add insult to injury they sent it on port 443) - Telegram is the bad guy (sent data encrypted but used a dodgy algorithm early on)
      - lmm 5y ago
        Encryption is one of those things where no algorithm is better than a bad algorithm - if you know your data is being sent in the clear then you can at least act appropriately. And the attitude of the Telegram developers when they were called out is particularly concerning.
        skinkestek 5y ago
        > Encryption is one of those things where no algorithm is better than a bad algorithm Absolutely not universally true: Encryption that protect against everyone except NSA is still infinitely much better than sending plaintext. Internet banking can't work with plaintext. It can work perfectly fine even if everyone knows NSA could break it.
skinkestek 5y ago
> A messenger that has E2E encryption might not be secure, but a messenger that doesn't have E2E encryption is definitely insecure. It is secure for my purposes. Throwing away threat models and the meaning of secure and encrypted just to be able to define something that competes for attention as "not secure" and "not encrypted" (from other threads) isn't very high level, it is basic framing. edit: > Not caring about your messages being read, or being willing to trust the operator of the service, is fine, but in that case I struggle to see why you'd pick Telegram, given that their whole selling point was about privacy and encryption when their encryption didn't actually work. Remember, when Telegram came around WhatsApp was un-encrypted. Not point-to-point encrypted, just encoded. You didn't need to know or crack a key, you just needed toknow the protocol. Also, the main selling point of Telegram as I remember it wasn't security, it was dumb IMO, it was "we will be free (no cost) forever while WhatsApp is going to charge you money". Finally it isn't that I don't care if my messages are read, K just cannot care if my messages are read by NSA or FSB. If they go after me nothing will stop them.
- lmm 5y ago
  > Throwing away threat models and the meaning of secure and encrypted just to be able to define something that competes for attention as "not secure" and "not encrypted" (from other threads) isn't very high level, it is basic framing. It's basic, but it's valid. I was responding to all your "It doesn't matter if it is E2E-encrypted if xyz" points, which are faulty logic; if whether it's E2E-encrypted matters in your threat model, then whether it's E2E-encrypted still matters in your threat model even if other aspects of the system are secure. > Remember, when Telegram came around WhatsApp was un-encrypted. Not point-to-point encrypted, just encoded. You didn't need to know or crack a key, you just needed toknow the protocol. Citation? I don't remember it happening that way at all; Telegram marketed themselves by attacking WhatsApp on a couple of minor vulnerabilities in side features like video handling (which was legitimate in some ways, but extremely hypocritical given the bigger weaknesses in Telegram's own implementation). If message text was readable that would have been a much bigger deal.
  - skinkestek 5y ago
    > It's basic, but it's valid. I wrote basic framing. It is a valid and effective marketing technique but not something you should rely on in a technical discussion. > if whether it's E2E-encrypted matters in your threat model, then whether it's E2E-encrypted still matters in your threat model even if other aspects of the system are secure. Then we agree :-) I've been communicating over email, irc and lots of other channels that were not E2E-encrypted for years and I still have to. I'll have to live with the fact that my bank, my government and a number of others have unencrypted, realtime access to far more sensitive data than Telegram. The fact that someone can read my Telegram messages consisting of perfectly innocent photos is way down on my list as long as they who do it has a lot to lose by doing it ;-) (I.e. if you had access it would be a problem. If any serious agency has access they will never use it against me because then they give away that they have the capability. In the same way Telegram has everything to lose by letting employees snoop. Same as Google: I do not fear them snooping my mail, I fear their AI will kill my account and no one will tell me why.) > Citation? I don't remember it happening that way at all; Telegram marketed themselves by attacking WhatsApp on a couple of minor vulnerabilities in side features like video handling (which was legitimate in some ways, but extremely hypocritical given the bigger weaknesses in Telegram's own implementation). If message text was readable that would have been a much bigger deal. I've followed Telegram quite closely so I am fairly certain about their marketing message early on. As you can see it also put them in a bad light so thats something too. I've been unable to find references for the point about just being encoded, not encrypted so take that with a grain of salt for now. Some evidence can probably be found in an old unofficial client repo or someone who wrote one of those can confirm. I might be wrong but remember this was back in 2009. It was a whole different world back then. I used and liked WhatsApp despite all this because just like with Telegram perfect security didn't matter for the kind of communication I have on messengers back then either.