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Who Owns In-Chip Monitoring Data?
- userbinator 5y agoThis article is immensely creepy. Hardware-level telemetry. I'm pretty sure no users actually want things like this.
- kurthr 5y agoI'll say having been in a neighboring industry that this sounds quite odd and only really relevant to SoCs, which is good since I don't want any more surface/vulnerabilities in the many HW/FW support components like we've seen with branch-prediction and caching. I suppose SMART for HD is somewhat similar to this, but it's not hidden and is completely customer focused. The only other consumer useful things I can think of here would be over-temp and over-volt memory for failure debugging, and maybe parity or ECC failures. Those should either be available as registers at boot or through some external serial bus. That's what I've seen for high volume testing to improve yields. You don't want to be running an OS with a 7-14 second takt time for component testing. From their description you still have to get the data out somehow. Most of it can't survive a power-cycle or it needs flash to be stored in the "database" they describe, but then it's in memory you can see from the processor and unless it's encrypted could be reverse engineered. I don't see there being backdoors to radios or ethernet (OK I can see router companies doing this). It really doesn't sound like something to run while you're in production rather than test. It adds power, possibly latency, and even designing it in make closure and testing more complex. Kinda crazy not to make that modal.
- yummypaint 5y agoThis puts control at the level of software, which can be updated and changed if necessary, making it more flexible. It also means that if are no subscribers, the firmware can be updated to stop pulling the data and sending it to the data center. Is this a contributor to why companies resist releasing open source drivers?
- swiley 5y agoRemember: There is never a legitimate reason not to publish source code.
- marcan_42 5y agoThis article handwaves over data getting from a chip to a datacenter. That's not a thing without software brokering it. This is certainly a thing, but it's not controlled by chipmakers, it's controlled by whoever writes the software/drivers. For example, on iPhones you can look at the analytics data being sent to Apple, and you'll see it includes chip-level information like performance counters, which they presumably use to optimize things in future chips. Chips don't go off connecting to network servers by themselves (and if someone designs a chip that does, you'd have to be insane to choose it when you design a product). Of course, I wouldn't be in the least bit surprised if e.g. the Qualcomm closed-source middleware that ships with many phones had features along these lines. One can hope phone manufacturers audit this stuff, but who knows...
- mcshicks 5y agoYou are exactly right about the hand waving. I think it's kind of actually an ad for the "monitoring partners", like this one mentioned in the link. Here is a video from one of them that talks about their "Universal Chip Telemetry" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4q6-igEbLt0 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4q6-igEbLt0 In my (dated) experience it's actually mostly talking about production data, like built in self test which are run in hardware test modes on specialized equipment before the parts (or dies) are put on a board or in the system. The other time these are run are when return parts are retested. It's possible some limited amount of die space could be used to store some kind of hardware errors, but in my (dated) experience that would generally be with some kind of small one time programmable memory. If you watch the video there is a lot of detail on how they are going to detect the issues in hardware an basically none on how they actually transmit it off chip.
- beckman466 5y ago> Chips don't go off connecting to network servers by themselves I thought all modern computers still come with Intel Management Engine (ME) type software and hardware on chips? Or is this behavior somehow excused because Silicon Valley and American tech companies are seen as 'the good guys'? Also, I am now re-reading the Wikipedia page for Intel ME, and it's pretty worrying: First for those who aren't familiar with Intel ME: > The Intel Management Engine (ME), also known as the Intel Manageability Engine,[1][2] is an autonomous subsystem that has been incorporated in virtually all of Intel's processor chipsets since 2008.[1][3][4] It is located in the Platform Controller Hub of modern Intel motherboards. > The Intel Management Engine always runs as long as the motherboard is receiving power, even when the computer is turned off. This issue can be mitigated with deployment of a hardware device, which is able to disconnect mains power. > The Intel ME is an attractive target for hackers, since it has top level access to all devices and completely bypasses the operating system. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has voiced concern about Intel ME and some security researchers have voiced concern that it is a backdoor. > Intel's main competitor AMD has incorporated the equivalent AMD Secure Technology (formally called Platform Security Processor) in virtually all of its post-2013 CPUs.[5] and then about the security vulnerabilities: > Several weaknesses have been found in the ME. On May 1, 2017, Intel confirmed a Remote Elevation of Privilege bug (SA-00075) in its Management Technology.[37] Every Intel platform with provisioned Intel Standard Manageability, Active Management Technology, or Small Business Technology, from Nehalem in 2008 to Kaby Lake in 2017 has a remotely exploitable security hole in the ME.[38][39] Several ways to disable the ME without authorization that could allow ME's functions to be sabotaged have been found.[40][41][42] Additional major security flaws in the ME affecting a very large number of computers incorporating ME, Trusted Execution Engine (TXE), and Server Platform Services (SPS) firmware, from Skylake in 2015 to Coffee Lake in 2017, were confirmed by Intel on 20 November 2017 (SA-00086).[43][44] Unlike SA-00075, this bug is even present if AMT is absent, not provisioned or if the ME was "disabled" by any of the known unofficial methods.[45] In July 2018 another set of vulnerabilities was disclosed (SA-00112).[46] In September 2018, yet another vulnerability was published (SA-00125).[47] > In May 2017, Intel confirmed that many computers with AMT have had an unpatched critical privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2017-5689).[39][52][37][53][54] The vulnerability, which was nicknamed "Silent Bob is Silent" by the researchers who had reported it to Intel,[55] affects numerous laptops, desktops and servers sold by Dell, Fujitsu, Hewlett-Packard (later Hewlett Packard Enterprise and HP Inc.), Intel, Lenovo, and possibly others.[55][56][57][58][59][60][61] Those researchers claimed that the bug affects systems made in 2010 or later.[62] Other reports claimed the bug also affects systems made as long ago as 2008.[63][39] The vulnerability was described as giving remote attackers: > "full control of affected machines, including the ability to read and modify everything. It can be used to install persistent malware (possibly in firmware), and read and modify any data." — Tatu Ylönen, ssh.com[55] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine
- bitwize 5y agoWhat's the over-under on in-chip monitors scanning your RAM for CSAM (and, eventually, other undesirable materials and computations) in the next decade or so?
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]