3 ms·
> It causes weird and overly broad privileges though usually, because you need to give permission to do any possible thing the job or user of the credentials CO
by OJFord 5y ago
> It causes weird and overly broad privileges though usually, because you need to give permission to do any possible thing the job or user of the credentials COULD need to do, all the time.
Not really, unless you mean it needs permission to assume all the roles it could need in order to have the permissions it requires.
- lazide 5y agoThat is exactly what I mean. A web server that makes database requests needs permission to do any query a web request would need to be able to trigger - not just permission for the specific query that makes sense for the specific request it is serving at the time. It’s the difference between ‘can query the database’ and ‘can retrieve user Clarice’s profile information because she just made a request To the profile edit page’ Does that make sense?
- OJFord 5y agoYes, I understand, but the point I'm making is that it does support 'roles', 'assuming' them for a period of time, then dropping those privileges again, or 'assuming' a different one, etc. The 'because' isn't there, but I'm not really sure what that would look like, at least in a meaningful (not trivially spoofable) way.
- lazide 5y agoBut no one is creating a role For read, modify, write for every distinct user bit of data no? Or at least I hope not and I doubt the system would function if they tried. Tokens can do that.
- OJFord 5y agoBut don't you just move the problem to the token-granting authority? Don't get me wrong, I do see the hypothetical benefit, I'm just having trouble envisaging a practical solution. Is there something else not on AWS (or third-party for it) that works as you'd like IAM to?
- lazide 5y agoI don’t think you understand my comment? (And the top level comment?) Your token grantor is just taking in whatever request state you have (session, permissions granted, whatever), and stuffing them into the token that gets passed around. Then the various back ends and client calls also do that, and where there is a permissions check (or conversion) necessary, say on a backend API call to access something, it checks it the callers token has the right permission. I don’t want IAM to work that way. I don’t want to use IAM for this? It’s the wrong tool. There are a ton of various signed token frameworks, all with various trade offs. JWT (ugh), Gaia Mint (internal Google), etc. It tends to work best where there are multiple layers of services, as you have an abstraction layer you can do checking/audits, etc. at.
- OJFord 5y ago> a backend API call to access something, it checks it the callers token has the right permission. Fine, but then that backend handler has permission itself to do whatever it is, regardless of whether or not the token does, since as you said, it COULD need it to service that request? > I don’t want IAM to work that way. I don’t want to use IAM for this? It’s the wrong tool. Yes.. I.. agree, I'm confused now why we're even talking about IAM, it's solving a slightly similar problem at a different level; isn't particularly useful here.
- lazide 5y agoToken checking can happen literally at the DB layer, or storage layer if you have such a system (like Google or AWS or whatever). And I don't know why, you're the only who responded to my reply to 'What specifically do you have issues with when it comes to IAM?' Haha
- OJFord 5y agoWell the use case wasn't clear to me 'up there', I thought you were arguing against IAM in general, or for cases where others do use it. Essentially I suppose I disagree that it's only good for human users with long-lived roles, but I'm not saying it's the right tool for per-request granular authn, and I'd be surprised to learn that anyone is saying or (trying to be) using it like that. IAM's not even for end human users, (as in of your application) nevermind breaking further down into different types of request from them or on their behalf.