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This isn't about users' entitlement to run software, but about publishers and users' ability to confirm that everyone has the same version of the software -- to

by schoen 5y ago

This isn't about users' entitlement to run software, but about publishers and users' ability to confirm that everyone has the same version of the software -- to mitigate supply-chain attacks. This is a real, actual concern because governments and probably organized crime are interested in attacking supply chains in order to attack end users, for example by hacking software developers or publishers in order to substitute a slightly modified version of code. It could be useful for software distributors to have their version history memorialized somewhere outside of their own control, for example to reduce the attractiveness of governments trying to compel them to secretly tamper with some users' versions of a program, or to make it meaningful and more straightforward to check later on whether they published what they thought they published.

andrewmcwatters 5y ago
So once again, what is the difference between this and an authorized list of integrity hash values? Edit: I misread the latter portion of your post. I see now. Thanks.
- schoen 5y ago
  As some other replies pointed out, if that list is distributed in the same place as the software itself, an attacker can modify both of them at the same time. Maybe the list is digitally signed by the publisher, but then often the signing key is also distributed in the same place as the software itself (and also often used on the same infrastructure that the software was compiled on). Also, if the list of hash values is distributed only by a software publisher, the software publisher will get the ability to secretly backdoor some users, but not others, by creating two or more different versions of that list. Then it can deny the existence of the backdoored version to the public (or to itself, if the backdooring was done by an unauthorized insider!).
  - andrewmcwatters 5y ago
    Right, I can understand how this would be important now. Thank you.
allset_ 5y ago
It's also a significant step in a direction to where every dependency that these software publishers is also signed, increasing the overall confidence that there's no malicious code in the software they publish.

by schoen 5y ago

andrewmcwatters 5y ago

So once again, what is the difference between this and an authorized list of integrity hash values? Edit: I misread the latter portion of your post. I see now. Thanks.

schoen 5y ago
As some other replies pointed out, if that list is distributed in the same place as the software itself, an attacker can modify both of them at the same time. Maybe the list is digitally signed by the publisher, but then often the signing key is also distributed in the same place as the software itself (and also often used on the same infrastructure that the software was compiled on). Also, if the list of hash values is distributed only by a software publisher, the software publisher will get the ability to secretly backdoor some users, but not others, by creating two or more different versions of that list. Then it can deny the existence of the backdoored version to the public (or to itself, if the backdooring was done by an unauthorized insider!).
- andrewmcwatters 5y ago
  Right, I can understand how this would be important now. Thank you.

allset_ 5y ago

It's also a significant step in a direction to where every dependency that these software publishers is also signed, increasing the overall confidence that there's no malicious code in the software they publish.