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I find it laughable whenever someone says "this is the last straw" because it just shows how incredibly misinformed they are. Yes, backdooring E2E encryption i

I find it laughable whenever someone says "this is the last straw" because it just shows how incredibly misinformed they are. Yes, backdooring E2E encryption in general is a bad idea. However, consider two things: * iCloud Photos was never E2E encrypted in the first place. They already can scan your photos all they want server-side, and they have been scanning for CSAM since 2019, while Google has been scanning for it since 2009. Yes, if iCloud Photos were to become E2E encrypted leaving in a backdoor like this could be bad, but it's still the lesser of two evils. Would you rather they keep photos non-E2E forever and have even more unfettered access to them than a "backdoor" allows? It does NOT scan photos that are not uploaded to the cloud, despite being on-device. And it's important to note the threshold and manual human review system put in place before the authorities receive any notification at all. * For iMessage, all this entails is warning children under 18 about explicit content, and optionally notifying parents if the child is under 13 and the parent opted in. (I don't think it even sends the photo itself to the parents, but that's not explicitly clarified anywhere.) At no point do Apple or the authorities learn the contents of E2E encrypted iMessages. (Also worth noting: if you use iCloud Backup, your messages are no longer E2E encrypted in the backup, as Apple holds the keys to that. This was true even before the new system was introduced.)

Notanothertoo 5y ago
Exactly. This has all been done for 10 years in various forms.
new299 5y ago
> Would you rather they keep photos non-E2E forever and have even more unfettered access to them than a "backdoor" allows? It does NOT scan photos that are not uploaded to the cloud, despite being on-device. Yes I'd rather they do this. The fact that they're implementing on device checks doesn't suggest to me that they will be deploying E2E encryption. It suggests to me that they will be expanding on device scanning to all content in the future. If they were going to make iCloud E2E encrypted, it would be a clear win to announce this at the same time as deploying on device scanning.
- nicce 5y ago
  Their PR did not handle this well. If you look at the spec, new encryption level has been added, which allows access by Apple only if CSAM hash threshold is reached. It is E2EE with backdoor now.
  - charcircuit 5y ago
    It's not a backdoor if it's a public part of the system / protocol.
    - nicce 5y ago
      Hmm... that is technically correct.
  - new299 5y ago
    Unless you have a public reference, I really doubt this is the case. Because they’d also need to be announcing that you can no longer reset your iCloud password and recover to a new device. And I’ve not seen anything that suggests this. So I suspect it is encrypted at rest, with a key known to Apple as before as well as this CSAM approach.
    - nicce 5y ago
      There is public reference on Apple site[1]. Citing final phrase on the paper to TLDR their system: > Apple is able to learn the relevant image information only once the account has more than a threshold number of CSAM matches, and even then, only for the matching images. This applies only for images, so you can still reset your password. Technically, there are two layers of encryption on images. Regular server-side encryption and this "E2EE like" encryption, which allows access for CSAM matches in specific threshold. [1]: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
      - new299 5y ago
RHSeeger 5y ago
> It does NOT scan photos that are not uploaded to the cloud, despite being on-device. Yet. Once it's on the device, it's a MUCH smaller step to use it in other ways. It's certainly easier fro governments to argue that they should be able to force it to be used arbitrarily... you know, for the children/terrorists/etc. > And it's important to note the threshold and manual human review system put in place before the authorities receive any notification at all. Until it's not. Once again, once it's in place, it's a lot easier for malevolent actors (governments) to force it to be used other ways. This a back door. Plain and simple. The fact that it's not _currently_ going to be used for evil (depending on your definition of evil) does not mean it won't be in the near future. Back doors are bad. How many times does this need to be said?
- treesknees 5y ago
  > Yet I keep seeing this jump. There's no evidence this will happen. Apple can already technically do anything they want to compromise the security of your device in the next software update, so could Google or Samsung or any other company. But when in Apple's history have they done this? There is zero reason to believe this is the next step other than speculation and fear mongering.
  - RHSeeger 5y ago
    > Apple can already technically do anything they want to compromise the security of your device in the next software update But they're making it easier for governments to come along and force them to do more. Or even for themselves, but I tend to think they're less of an issue. I know "it's a slippery slope" gets overused... but if you keep taking baby slips down that slope, it only gets slipperier. You should avoid taking as many of those steps as possible.
    - nicce 5y ago
      > But they're making it easier for governments to come along and force them to do more. Or even for themselves, but I tend to think they're less of an issue. It is as easy as always been. Only problem is that this might give them new ideas. As the most of the politics are probably non-tech people, they don’t know what is possible. For tech person, functionality like this (on-device scanning and flagging) is super trivial to add. Antivirus engines have existed decades.

Notanothertoo 5y ago

Exactly. This has all been done for 10 years in various forms.

new299 5y ago

> Would you rather they keep photos non-E2E forever and have even more unfettered access to them than a "backdoor" allows? It does NOT scan photos that are not uploaded to the cloud, despite being on-device. Yes I'd rather they do this. The fact that they're implementing on device checks doesn't suggest to me that they will be deploying E2E encryption. It suggests to me that they will be expanding on device scanning to all content in the future. If they were going to make iCloud E2E encrypted, it would be a clear win to announce this at the same time as deploying on device scanning.

nicce 5y ago
Their PR did not handle this well. If you look at the spec, new encryption level has been added, which allows access by Apple only if CSAM hash threshold is reached. It is E2EE with backdoor now.
- charcircuit 5y ago
  It's not a backdoor if it's a public part of the system / protocol.
  - nicce 5y ago
    Hmm... that is technically correct.
- new299 5y ago
  Unless you have a public reference, I really doubt this is the case. Because they’d also need to be announcing that you can no longer reset your iCloud password and recover to a new device. And I’ve not seen anything that suggests this. So I suspect it is encrypted at rest, with a key known to Apple as before as well as this CSAM approach.
  - nicce 5y ago
    There is public reference on Apple site[1]. Citing final phrase on the paper to TLDR their system: > Apple is able to learn the relevant image information only once the account has more than a threshold number of CSAM matches, and even then, only for the matching images. This applies only for images, so you can still reset your password. Technically, there are two layers of encryption on images. Regular server-side encryption and this "E2EE like" encryption, which allows access for CSAM matches in specific threshold. [1]: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
    - new299 5y ago

RHSeeger 5y ago

> It does NOT scan photos that are not uploaded to the cloud, despite being on-device. Yet. Once it's on the device, it's a MUCH smaller step to use it in other ways. It's certainly easier fro governments to argue that they should be able to force it to be used arbitrarily... you know, for the children/terrorists/etc. > And it's important to note the threshold and manual human review system put in place before the authorities receive any notification at all. Until it's not. Once again, once it's in place, it's a lot easier for malevolent actors (governments) to force it to be used other ways. This a back door. Plain and simple. The fact that it's not _currently_ going to be used for evil (depending on your definition of evil) does not mean it won't be in the near future. Back doors are bad. How many times does this need to be said?

treesknees 5y ago
> Yet I keep seeing this jump. There's no evidence this will happen. Apple can already technically do anything they want to compromise the security of your device in the next software update, so could Google or Samsung or any other company. But when in Apple's history have they done this? There is zero reason to believe this is the next step other than speculation and fear mongering.
- RHSeeger 5y ago
  > Apple can already technically do anything they want to compromise the security of your device in the next software update But they're making it easier for governments to come along and force them to do more. Or even for themselves, but I tend to think they're less of an issue. I know "it's a slippery slope" gets overused... but if you keep taking baby slips down that slope, it only gets slipperier. You should avoid taking as many of those steps as possible.
  - nicce 5y ago
    > But they're making it easier for governments to come along and force them to do more. Or even for themselves, but I tend to think they're less of an issue. It is as easy as always been. Only problem is that this might give them new ideas. As the most of the politics are probably non-tech people, they don’t know what is possible. For tech person, functionality like this (on-device scanning and flagging) is super trivial to add. Antivirus engines have existed decades.