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Apple doesn’t scan iCloud for CSAM and refuses to do it. Which is why they researched intensively on differential privacy.
by nojito 5y ago
Apple doesn’t scan iCloud for CSAM and refuses to do it. Which is why they researched intensively on differential privacy.
- sneak 5y agoBut they could, as iCloud Photos is not e2e (Apple can read all of it) and they turn over the user data on over 30,000 users per year to the USG without even a warrant. This is just farce.
- zepto 5y ago> But they could, as iCloud Photos is not e2e Client side scanning is a prerequsite to making it e2e if you also want countermeasures against CSAM.
- amanaplanacanal 5y agoHas Apple said this is what they are going to do, or are people just guessing?
- zepto 5y agoThey haven’t announced this, but they invest a lot in encryption and privacy, and have stated that user privacy is a value of theirs. They have also expressed that they don’t want access to be able to be forced by law enforcement.
- sneak 5y agoTheir actions speak louder than their words.
- zepto 5y agoAnd their actions show that they aren’t likely to do any of the scary things they are being accused of. That’s the point - people keep claiming some nefarious slippery slope, which is of course in the realm of possibility, but is not actually happening.
- dont__panic 5y agoApple stores user iCloud backups and their encryption keys on Chinese government-controlled servers in China, and gives the Chinese government full access to those servers. And routinely grants the US government warrantless access to those same backups in the US. So what actions are you referring to that show they won't do any of those scary things?
- zepto 5y agoRight, so presumably you’d agree that the people who are saying that CSAM detection is a problem because China might abuse it are just being silly, right? As for the US government having access to the backups, that’s required by law. You can always make the paranoid case that Apple wants to do this because they are somehow lying about their values, or you can make the case that their hand has been forced. You could also note that they promised to implement e2e backups but haven’t yet, and this is rumored to be because the FBI asked them not to. If you assume that Apple is doing this stuff because they want to, then of course you’ll see this next move as just another bad thing they are doing. If on the other hand you consider that they don’t want to do these things but are being forced to until they have a better option, then you can look at this move as a way to get out of a double bind. Now they can turn on e2e without being accused of creating a safe haven for pedophiles. Both pathways are plausible, but given the investment in privacy Apple has been making and the consistency with which they state their values and boundaries, I don’t think they want to be creating backdoors.
- sneak 5y ago> As for the US government having access to the backups, that’s required by law. This is a false statement. Google's android backups are end to end encrypted.
- nojito 5y agoNo they refuse to indiscriminately scan iCloud.
- thw0rted 5y agoDoes that 30k number include iCloud Photo data? Do you have a citation for this?
- sneak 5y agoApple's own transparency report, under FISA orders. Presumably it includes all subscriber data they can access for the specified accounts, so likely contacts, photos, and device backups (full iMessage chat history, or sync keys to decrypt same). FISA orders are not warrants and do not require probable cause; the FISA Amendments Act Section 702 spying that goes on (aka PRISM internally to the IC) pulls data directly from cloud provider systems without a search warrant and was cited by Ed Snowden as one of the main reasons he came forward.