4 ms·
Missing is the analysis of the amount of entropy in an unaided "three random words" password. I'll try: people are lousy at random picking. Their choices are
by jepler 5y ago
Missing is the analysis of the amount of entropy in an unaided "three random words" password.
I'll try: people are lousy at random picking. Their choices are highly likely to come from the most common 1000 words, and very very likely to come from the most common 4000 words. If this is true, it gets you an entropy of 30 to 36 bits.
BUT
Just for curiosity I checked out NIST's current guidance on passwords; they actually allow 6-digit passwords (PINs) [with about 20 bits of entropy], as long as there is server-side rate limiting of authentication attempts [edited to add:] and are uniformly chosen by the server. They recognize that this does not mitigate offline cracking attempts. Since even choosing a random "top 100" word would meet the same entropy bar, perhaps my initial reaction is an over-reaction. [https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#appA https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#appA]
- SV_BubbleTime 5y agoThat’s exactly what I worked out a long time ago when looking at password managers and policy for my company. We had 8char, special, number, rolling 90 days, etc. Awful. I had looked at 3 random words as advice and same conclusion, even at 10,000 most common words, it was beyond trivial for offline cracking. 10,000 most common words ^ 3 and 100,000,000 guesses / sec is a few hours to crack. That’s the same complexity as 6x random keyboard characters. Not even sort of good. Our last pen test was rife with offline cracking. I ended by teaching passphrases and recommending at least 4 words or whatever tricks they like and will remember. In four years since, not a single forgotten password request.