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To me it is clear they are bowing to government pressure to add this feature. I cannot imagine any other reason they would go from drawing so much attention to
by fitblipper 5y ago
To me it is clear they are bowing to government pressure to add this feature. I cannot imagine any other reason they would go from drawing so much attention to privacy of their platform in their communication and general PR around the launch of the privacy labels in the app store to then make this change which is a clear violation of their user's privacy.
- gowld 5y agoA lot of people not in government are also fiercely opposed to raping children and are willing to compromise, and understand that Apple can already do whatever they want to your phone, so this specific thing isn't the straw that breaks the camel's back. All the "what if Apple turns evil one day" applies equally well to iOS without this feature.
- strogonoff 5y agoI believe a lot of the outrage brewing now against Apple’s CSAM scanning is misdirected, and might actually be hurting the larger cause. Most ordinary people, especially those who have kids, won’t have a problem with a well-implemented, E2E encryption compatible scheme that is legally limited to only apply to this type of material. If explained the hash collision issue, they’d reasonably point out that Apple does manual review before notifying law enforcement, so this rare eventuality is something they can live with. Meanwhile, in the other camp, many of the vocally outraged fail to understand that no E2E encryption breakage has to be taking place for this feature to work. What’s actually a problem is that earlier, back in 2019, Apple changed their ToS to allow pre-screening of generally any “potentially illegal” content[0]. This should trigger much wider audience, and for legitimate reasons (the phrasing is clearly unnecessarily broad, and opposing this does not undermine kids’ safety in any way), yet no one is talking about it to my knowledge. [0] https://www.macobserver.com/analysis/apple-scans-uploaded-content/ https://www.macobserver.com/analysis/apple-scans-uploaded-co...
- pseudalopex 5y agoIt isn't E2E when the middle can decrypt. Rare is an assumption.
- strogonoff 5y agoRead up on technical fundamentals, specifically homomorphic encryption.
- pseudalopex 5y agoThe point of homomorphic encryption is the middle can do things without decrypting. And Apple's system doesn't use homomorphic encryption.
- strogonoff 5y ago> And Apple's system doesn't use homomorphic encryption. Do you work for Apple?
- pseudalopex 5y agoI read the technical summary.[1] [1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
- strogonoff 5y agoDid you learn the same thing—that E2E encryption doesn’t need to be broken for this to work? The only event in which Apple can gain access to your content is if you happen to have multiple CSAM matches; then they can access only the matching content, and only then if it’s manually confirmed by a human to be CSAM an action is taken. The issue is if this type of matching is done for other purposes than CSAM; and unfortunately they gave themselves legal permission to do it back in 2019. That’s what we should object to, not CSAM reporting.
- dylan604 5y agoCynical me thinks this is some "deal" they made with DoJ to not have the FBI sue them any more for backdoors in such a public fashion. As long as they work with them in manners that give the FBI info they want while claiming to protect user privacy compared to just throwing open the doors, Apple thinks they are saving face.???