5 ms·
GrapheneOS, lacking MicroG in the default install, is therefore more private than CalyxOS. Keeping Google out of the loop entirely is necessary for true privacy
by vngzs 5y ago
GrapheneOS, lacking MicroG in the default install, is therefore more private than CalyxOS. Keeping Google out of the loop entirely is necessary for true privacy.
- cdesai 5y agoOn CalyxOS you do get an option to disable microG when setting it up for the first time, see https://calyxos.org/features/microg/#1-microg-disabled https://calyxos.org/features/microg/#1-microg-disabled microG being disabled but present is still enough for some apps to work, which makes sense given that you can disable Google Play Services on the stock OS.
- folmar 5y agoIt seems to miss my favourite with Lineage - microG enabled, but C2DM disabled, i.e. services present, but no talking to google servers (but maps api, locations and so on still work). Disclaimer: I've only read the linked webpage.
- commoner 5y agoYou're able to enable microG on CalyxOS while disabling Google device registration and Firebase Cloud Messaging (the current push messaging service which has replaced the deprecated C2DM). The microG Services Core app behaves on CalyxOS exactly as it does on LineageOS for microG.
- strcat 5y agoGrapheneOS has https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services so our users have the option to use Play services too, in a way that will provide more functionality and avoids losing the security checks and key pinning that are missing in microG. We'll be making it easy for users to install via our app repository rather than bundling Google services in the OS. Google's Play client libraries are still used on CalyxOS by the apps using Play services. The Ads SDK is a fat library and works without Play services. Only the Lite variant of that has a hard dependency on Play. GrapheneOS isn't giving any additional access to Play when it's installed compared to what the client libraries have available. WhatsApp is clearly a proprietary service too, and CalyxOS is integrating that into the Dialer app. Signal's server source code is not fully public either and went a whole year without even the incomplete releases that are now available again. Both are centralized, third party services integrated in a special way not available to other apps. Isn't that the problem with Play services? It is from our perspective.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- cdesai 5y ago> Google's Play client libraries are still used on CalyxOS by the apps using Play services. They'd also be used on GrapheneOS, and anywhere else basically. > WhatsApp is clearly a proprietary service too, and CalyxOS is integrating that into the Dialer app. The integration is entirely done into the open source Dialer app and generic enough that it could be extended to any apps that have phone numbers. Signal and WhatsApp are simply the most popular amongst those.
- FieryBinary 5y ago>They'd also be used on GrapheneOS, and anywhere else basically. The issue is that you're giving Google services privilege and integration not available to other apps.
- strcat 5y agoGrapheneOS doesn't ship integration of proprietary services like CalyxOS, whether that's WhatsApp or Google services. GrapheneOS does have https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services providing a way to use Play services in a sandbox with zero special privileges. This doesn't provide Play with any access beyond what it has in the client libraries within apps using it. Many of those client libraries aren't simply thin clients. The Ads library works without Play services. There's a special Lite variant that's actually a thin client: https://developers.google.com/admob/android/lite-sdk https://developers.google.com/admob/android/lite-sdk. GrapheneOS does this by implement the missing fallback code Play services should have itself to work without any invasive OS integration. We believe these services should be on an equal playing field. Google services shouldn't be built into the OS and shouldn't have capabilities not available to a regular sandboxed app. Our views are counter to a whole lot of what CalyxOS is doing which is bundling third party apps/services and giving them special capabilities. For example, they give special unattended installation privileges to Aurora Store and F-Droid. F-Droid still targets API 25 (Android 7.1) which wouldn't meet the security requirements of the Play Store (API 29+) if it could be uploaded there. It also lacks modern cryptography and signing with full file signing + key rotation. Lots of attack surface too. They give it the ability to do unattended app installations without user consent. If it gets compromised in any way, it can install mimic apps, etc. tricking the user. It could install ancient API level apps with the weakest possible sandbox. Android 12 will be providing a far safer way to do this, and that's what the in-development GrapheneOS app repository client will be using rather than being granted special privileges by the OS. F-Droid is still using partial file signing without key rotation for app repositories too. It does many things that we cannot accept for an app bundled into the OS.
- cdesai 5y agoI did not want to get into this, but you're simply spread falsehoods. > GrapheneOS doesn't ship integration of proprietary services like CalyxOS, whether that's WhatsApp or Google services. We do not ship anything proprietary. We ship microG, which is "A free-as-in-freedom re-implementation of Google’s proprietary Android user space apps and libraries." - see https://microg.org/ https://microg.org/ We ship an integration with WhatsApp in the Dialer, which is entirely open source code. It is based on the existing contacts mechanism (anyone who has WhatsApp or Signal on any Android will see entries for those in the Contacts app - that is what we expose to the Dialer to make it easy to use those to make end-to-end encrypted calls. In fact, WhatsApp is not listed by default, it only shows up if you have it installed. We believe that end-to-end encrypted calls are important, and while this would leak some metadata, if one has it installed already presumably they're fine with that. The network effect is strong! In fact, you're the one who's promoting your approach of being able to run the proprietary Play Services - and yet you say you don't ship integration of proprietary services. Which is it? You can't ship Play Services legally anyway. > or example, they give special unattended installation privileges to Aurora Store and F-Droid. Aurora Store does not get unattended installation permission, it never has. It can only update installed apps, which is what Google is allowing in Android 12. F-Droid Privileged Extension is extended, and both that and F-Droid have received security audits in the past which haven't found issues - and the Privileged Extension itself hasn't changed much since then. We're very careful about making any changes there. It is one thing to give constructive criticism to projects, it's another to attack them directly based on falsehoods.