iCloud photos aren’t currently encrypted, but this system provides a clear path to doing that, while staving accusations that E2E of iCloud will allow people to

iCloud photos aren’t currently encrypted, but this system provides a clear path to doing that, while staving accusations that E2E of iCloud will allow people to host CP there with impunity. When the device uploads an image it’s also required to upload a cryptographic blob derived from the CSAM database which can then be used by iCloud to identify photos that might match. As built at the moment, your phone only “snitches” on you when it uploads a photo to iCloud. No uploads, no snitching. We know that every other cloud provider scans uploads for CSAM, they just do it server side because their systems aren’t E2E. This doesn’t change the fact that having such a scanning capability built into iOS is scary, or can be misused. But in its original conception, it’s not unreasonable for Apple to say that your device must provide a cryptographic attestation that data uploaded isn’t CP. I think Apple is in a very hard place here. They’re almost certainly under significant pressure to prove their systems can’t be abused for storing or distributing CP, and coming out and saying they’ll do nothing to prevent CP is suicide. But equally the alternative is a horrific violation of privacy. Unfortunately all this just points to a larger societal issue. Where CP has been weaponised, and authorities are more interested in preventing the distribution of CP, rather than it’s creation. Presumably because one of those is much easier to solve, and creates better headlines, than the other.