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It’s astounding how many very smart people are getting this wrong. Perhaps I missed it, but does anywhere on this letter mention that that both of these featur

by websites2023 5y ago

It’s astounding how many very smart people are getting this wrong. Perhaps I missed it, but does anywhere on this letter mention that that both of these features are optional? CSAM depends on using iCloud Photos. Don’t rent someone else’s computer if you don’t want them to decide what you can put on it. Content filter for iMessages is for kids accounts only, and can be turned off. Or, even better: skip iMessages for Signal.

epanchin 5y ago
The new system is overkill for iCloud, which Apple already scans. The obvious conclusion is Apple will start to scan photos kept on device, even where iCloud is not used. Very smart people are not getting this wrong.
- websites2023 5y ago
  > The obvious conclusion is Apple will start to scan photos kept on device, even where iCloud is not used. Why is this the obvious conclusion?
  - whartung 5y ago
    Partly it falls under the supposition of "if they can, they will". It's also suggested when they tout that they are going to start blurring "naked" pictures, of any kind, sent to children under 14. Which means they need some kind of tech to detect "naked" pictures, locally, across encrypted channels, in order to block them. In theory, this is different tech than CSAM, which is supposed to checking hashes against a global database, vs determining the "nakedness" score of an arbitrary picture. But, scan them once, scan them all, on your phone. The details start to matter less and less. Also, since they already scanning all of the photos up on iCloud already, why would they need to have it put locally on the phone? Finally, I know that Apple scans photos on my device, because that's how I get those "memories" of Furry Friends with vignettes of my cats. I don't even use iCloud. (To be clear, I love this feature. Send me movies of my cats once a week.)
    - websites2023 5y ago
      >They already scanning all of the photos up on iCloud already I can't find a source for this. Do you happen to have one? It seems to me that Apple doesn't want to host CSAM on their servers, so they're scanning your device so that if it does get uploaded, they can remove it and then ban you. They're not scanning all photos on iCloud, as far as I can tell.
    - websites2023 5y ago
      > Partly it falls under the supposition of "if they can, they will". Hm. But there are many millions of things Apple could do, but haven’t, because it would hurt their business model. So how would what you are proposing they will do help their business model? > Which means they need some kind of tech to detect "naked" pictures, locally, across encrypted channels, in order to block them. I know you know this is the case, but to make it clear for anyone reading: Apple is not blocking nude pictures in the kids filter. It’s blurring and giving a message. Again I ask: why would using this technology on non-nude stuff benefit Apple? Are we worried about Apple or are we worried about the government forcing Apple to do things that this technology enables?
- shuckles 5y ago
  Apple does not already scan iCloud.
  - willseth 5y ago
    Not sure why this got downvoted. This is correct and very thoroughly documented.
    - shuckles 5y ago
      The meme tides have turned against logic on this topic.
- willseth 5y ago
  Apple doesn't "scan" iCloud. Not sure what you're talking about. Generally everything in iCloud is E2E encrypted, with the exception of iCloud Backups, where Apple holds onto a decryption key and will use it to comply with subpoenas. But nothing is "scanned," and if you don't use iCloud backup, Apple can't see your data.
  - shuckles 5y ago
    iCloud Photos aren’t E2E encrypted, but it’s unlikely they’re scanned for CSAM today because Apple generates effectively 0 references to NCMEC annually.
    - websites2023 5y ago
      I also believe Apple doesn't really want to scan your photos on their servers. I believe their competitors do, and they consider this compromise (scan on device with hashes) is their way of complying with CSAM demands while still maintaining their privacy story.
      - shuckles 5y ago
        Yes. Scope creep is much easier when implemented as scanning on plaintext data.
    - deleted 5y ago
      [deleted]
    - willseth 5y ago
      It's too late to edit my post, but you're right. iCloud Photos are not E2E encrypted, my misunderstanding.
- gerwim 5y ago
  >> The obvious conclusion is Apple will start to scan photos kept on device, even where iCloud is not used. Wrong [1]. It's even in the first line of the document which you apparently didn't even read: CSAM Detection enables Apple to accurately identify and report iCloud users who store known Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) in their iCloud Photos accounts This doesn't mean I'm supporting their new "feature". 1. https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
  - rantwasp 5y ago
    nah. it means that they don’t scan it yet. also by reading that doc and pointing to it means you trust apple. i used to trust apple when they were peddling their privacy marketing stuff. not anymore.
    - willseth 5y ago
      OK so let's all lose our shit over things that haven't happened.
willseth 5y ago
It's baffling. It seems like nearly everyone losing their shit over this doesn't understand how it works. Most of the commentary I see here and elsewhere is based on a misunderstanding of the implementation that blends the CSAM scanner with the child messaging scanner.
echelon 5y ago
Then why do the "CSAM" perceptual hashes live on the device and the checks themselves run on the device? Those hashes could be anything. Your phone is turning into a snitch against you, and the targeted content might be CCP Winnie the Pooh memes or content the people in charge do not like. We are not getting this wrong. Apple is taking an egregious step to satisfy the CCP and FBI. Future US politicians could easily be blackmailed by the non-illegal content on their phones. This is a jeopardy to our democracy. The only reason this was announced yesterday is because it was leaked on Twitter and to the press. Apple is in damage control mode. This isn't about protecting children. It's about control. Stop defending Apple.
- willseth 5y ago
  This boils down to two separate arguments against Apple: 1) what Apple has already implemented, and 2) what Apple might implement in the future. It's fine to be worried about the second one, but it's wrong to conflate the two.
  - websites2023 5y ago
    >It's fine to be worried about the second one, but it's wrong to conflate the two. Agreed, and just to be clear, I'm worried about that too. It just appears that we (myself and the objectors) have different lines. If Apple were to scan devices in the US and prevent them from sharing memes over iMessage, that would cross a line for me and I'd jump ship. But preventing CSAM stuff from getting on their servers seems fine to me.
    - echelon 5y ago
      > "preventing CSAM stuff from getting on their servers seems fine to me" You're either naive or holding your fingers in your ears if you think this is the objective. Let me repeat this again: this is a tool for the CCP, FBI, intelligence, and regimes.
      - magicloop 5y ago
ursugardaddy 5y ago
this is how it always starts, Apple went from 'no it's not possible to unlock the shooters phone' to 'yeah you can give us the fingerprint of any image (maybe doucuments too) and we'll check which of our users has it'

epanchin 5y ago

The new system is overkill for iCloud, which Apple already scans. The obvious conclusion is Apple will start to scan photos kept on device, even where iCloud is not used. Very smart people are not getting this wrong.

websites2023 5y ago
> The obvious conclusion is Apple will start to scan photos kept on device, even where iCloud is not used. Why is this the obvious conclusion?
- whartung 5y ago
  Partly it falls under the supposition of "if they can, they will". It's also suggested when they tout that they are going to start blurring "naked" pictures, of any kind, sent to children under 14. Which means they need some kind of tech to detect "naked" pictures, locally, across encrypted channels, in order to block them. In theory, this is different tech than CSAM, which is supposed to checking hashes against a global database, vs determining the "nakedness" score of an arbitrary picture. But, scan them once, scan them all, on your phone. The details start to matter less and less. Also, since they already scanning all of the photos up on iCloud already, why would they need to have it put locally on the phone? Finally, I know that Apple scans photos on my device, because that's how I get those "memories" of Furry Friends with vignettes of my cats. I don't even use iCloud. (To be clear, I love this feature. Send me movies of my cats once a week.)
  - websites2023 5y ago
    >They already scanning all of the photos up on iCloud already I can't find a source for this. Do you happen to have one? It seems to me that Apple doesn't want to host CSAM on their servers, so they're scanning your device so that if it does get uploaded, they can remove it and then ban you. They're not scanning all photos on iCloud, as far as I can tell.
  - websites2023 5y ago
    > Partly it falls under the supposition of "if they can, they will". Hm. But there are many millions of things Apple could do, but haven’t, because it would hurt their business model. So how would what you are proposing they will do help their business model? > Which means they need some kind of tech to detect "naked" pictures, locally, across encrypted channels, in order to block them. I know you know this is the case, but to make it clear for anyone reading: Apple is not blocking nude pictures in the kids filter. It’s blurring and giving a message. Again I ask: why would using this technology on non-nude stuff benefit Apple? Are we worried about Apple or are we worried about the government forcing Apple to do things that this technology enables?
shuckles 5y ago
Apple does not already scan iCloud.
- willseth 5y ago
  Not sure why this got downvoted. This is correct and very thoroughly documented.
  - shuckles 5y ago
    The meme tides have turned against logic on this topic.
willseth 5y ago
Apple doesn't "scan" iCloud. Not sure what you're talking about. Generally everything in iCloud is E2E encrypted, with the exception of iCloud Backups, where Apple holds onto a decryption key and will use it to comply with subpoenas. But nothing is "scanned," and if you don't use iCloud backup, Apple can't see your data.
- shuckles 5y ago
  iCloud Photos aren’t E2E encrypted, but it’s unlikely they’re scanned for CSAM today because Apple generates effectively 0 references to NCMEC annually.
  - websites2023 5y ago
    I also believe Apple doesn't really want to scan your photos on their servers. I believe their competitors do, and they consider this compromise (scan on device with hashes) is their way of complying with CSAM demands while still maintaining their privacy story.
    - shuckles 5y ago
      Yes. Scope creep is much easier when implemented as scanning on plaintext data.
  - deleted 5y ago
    [deleted]
  - willseth 5y ago
    It's too late to edit my post, but you're right. iCloud Photos are not E2E encrypted, my misunderstanding.
gerwim 5y ago
>> The obvious conclusion is Apple will start to scan photos kept on device, even where iCloud is not used. Wrong [1]. It's even in the first line of the document which you apparently didn't even read: CSAM Detection enables Apple to accurately identify and report iCloud users who store known Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) in their iCloud Photos accounts This doesn't mean I'm supporting their new "feature". 1. https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
- rantwasp 5y ago
  nah. it means that they don’t scan it yet. also by reading that doc and pointing to it means you trust apple. i used to trust apple when they were peddling their privacy marketing stuff. not anymore.
  - willseth 5y ago
    OK so let's all lose our shit over things that haven't happened.

willseth 5y ago

It's baffling. It seems like nearly everyone losing their shit over this doesn't understand how it works. Most of the commentary I see here and elsewhere is based on a misunderstanding of the implementation that blends the CSAM scanner with the child messaging scanner.

echelon 5y ago

Then why do the "CSAM" perceptual hashes live on the device and the checks themselves run on the device? Those hashes could be anything. Your phone is turning into a snitch against you, and the targeted content might be CCP Winnie the Pooh memes or content the people in charge do not like. We are not getting this wrong. Apple is taking an egregious step to satisfy the CCP and FBI. Future US politicians could easily be blackmailed by the non-illegal content on their phones. This is a jeopardy to our democracy. The only reason this was announced yesterday is because it was leaked on Twitter and to the press. Apple is in damage control mode. This isn't about protecting children. It's about control. Stop defending Apple.

willseth 5y ago
This boils down to two separate arguments against Apple: 1) what Apple has already implemented, and 2) what Apple might implement in the future. It's fine to be worried about the second one, but it's wrong to conflate the two.
- websites2023 5y ago
  >It's fine to be worried about the second one, but it's wrong to conflate the two. Agreed, and just to be clear, I'm worried about that too. It just appears that we (myself and the objectors) have different lines. If Apple were to scan devices in the US and prevent them from sharing memes over iMessage, that would cross a line for me and I'd jump ship. But preventing CSAM stuff from getting on their servers seems fine to me.
  - echelon 5y ago
    > "preventing CSAM stuff from getting on their servers seems fine to me" You're either naive or holding your fingers in your ears if you think this is the objective. Let me repeat this again: this is a tool for the CCP, FBI, intelligence, and regimes.
    - magicloop 5y ago

ursugardaddy 5y ago

this is how it always starts, Apple went from 'no it's not possible to unlock the shooters phone' to 'yeah you can give us the fingerprint of any image (maybe doucuments too) and we'll check which of our users has it'