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From Apple's original text[0]: > Apple’s method of detecting known CSAM is designed with user privacy in mind. Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the sys
by shrimpx 5y ago
From Apple's original text[0]:
> Apple’s method of detecting known CSAM is designed with user privacy in mind. Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the system performs on-device matching [...]
It's incredible that Apple arrived at the conclusion that client-side scanning that you cannot prevent is more private than cloud-scanning.
Since they claim they're only scanning iCloud content, why not scan in the cloud?
They decided the most private way is to scan iCloud content before it's uploaded to the cloud... Because if they scanned in the cloud it would be seen as a breach of privacy and is bad optics for a privacy-focused company? But scanning on the physical device that they have described as "personal" and "intimate" has better optics? That's amazing.
This decision can only be read as Apple paving the way to scanning all content on the device, to bypass the pesky "Backup to iCloud" options being turned off.
[0] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/ https://www.apple.com/child-safety/
- vmladenov 5y ago> Since they claim they're only scanning iCloud content, why not scan in the cloud? Because (I suspect) this is a precursor to E2EE encrypted iCloud Photos. Apple cannot plausibly claim it does not store malicious E2EE content on its servers without some kind of filter upon upload. This is that filter. Other services, including the current implementation of iCloud Photos, skate by because they do not allow E2EE photos.