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> Using another technology called threshold secret sharing, the system ensures the contents of the safety vouchers cannot be interpreted by Apple unless the iCl

> Using another technology called threshold secret sharing, the system ensures the contents of the safety vouchers cannot be interpreted by Apple unless the iCloud Photos account crosses a threshold of known CSAM content. The threshold is set to provide an extremely high level of accuracy and ensures less than a one in one trillion chance per year of incorrectly flagging a given account. Are they saying that they physically can’t access your iCloud until the threshold is reached, or just that they “promise not to”?

slaughtr 5y ago
If they can ever access it, then it's always "promise not to".
samrolken 5y ago
It sounds like this is a feature of the encryption used. Apple will not have enough of the key to decrypt anything unless there are enough vouchers which match.
- ggreer 5y ago
  Apple always has the decryption key for your iCloud data. When law enforcement requests an account's data, Apple decrypts the data and sends it over. Apple's law enforcement guidelines[1] explain: > iCloud content may include email, stored photos, documents, contacts, calendars, bookmarks, Safari Browsing History, Maps Search History, Messages and iOS device backups. iOS device backups may include photos and videos in the Camera Roll, device settings, app data, iMessage, Business Chat, SMS, and MMS messages and voicemail. All iCloud content data stored by Apple is encrypted at the location of the server. When third-party vendors are used to store data, Apple never gives them the encryption keys. Apple retains the encryption keys in its U.S. data centers. iCloud content, as it exists in the customer’s account, may be provided in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, or customer consent. This happens to thousands of accounts every year.[2] 1. See page 11: https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelin... 2. https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/us.html https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/us.html

slaughtr 5y ago

If they can ever access it, then it's always "promise not to".

samrolken 5y ago

It sounds like this is a feature of the encryption used. Apple will not have enough of the key to decrypt anything unless there are enough vouchers which match.

ggreer 5y ago
Apple always has the decryption key for your iCloud data. When law enforcement requests an account's data, Apple decrypts the data and sends it over. Apple's law enforcement guidelines[1] explain: > iCloud content may include email, stored photos, documents, contacts, calendars, bookmarks, Safari Browsing History, Maps Search History, Messages and iOS device backups. iOS device backups may include photos and videos in the Camera Roll, device settings, app data, iMessage, Business Chat, SMS, and MMS messages and voicemail. All iCloud content data stored by Apple is encrypted at the location of the server. When third-party vendors are used to store data, Apple never gives them the encryption keys. Apple retains the encryption keys in its U.S. data centers. iCloud content, as it exists in the customer’s account, may be provided in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, or customer consent. This happens to thousands of accounts every year.[2] 1. See page 11: https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelin... 2. https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/us.html https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/us.html