Agreed that homomorphic is a pretty absurd leap in the article. Shared my thoughts on what it could be in another comment. With regard to FHE, I'm familiar wit

Agreed that homomorphic is a pretty absurd leap in the article. Shared my thoughts on what it could be in another comment. With regard to FHE, I'm familiar with the concept in abstract, but this article and the comments made me wonder how traditional definitions of security work in a homomorphic world. Specifically, do we assume under FHE that the computation provider has no a-priori information beyond basic structure of the values contained? (i.e. do you need to exchange some key to the party who should be able to do computation, even if this key can't decrypt the ciphertext to plaintext?) Assuming this isn't the case, do we retain classical definitions of security (the ciphertext leaks no information about plaintext; large collections of ciphertexts similarly reveal no information about plaintexts, or the similarity or difference between any two plaintexts) under FHE? It seems if this holds true, FHE mathematically can't do this, as it would require revealing information from a ciphertext that means it is no longer effectively encrypted, hence it isn't homomorphic.