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Previous discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27986316 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27986316 TL;DR - The laptop owner didn't use a PIN on t
by EvanAnderson 5y ago
Previous discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27986316 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27986316
TL;DR - The laptop owner didn't use a PIN on the TPM or a secondary credential. The full disk encryption key was read off a SPI bus from the TPM.
- cmurf 5y agoI've got a Windows 10 system that uses TPM to seal a bitlocker key, out of the box. And nothing asks for a PIN prior to the login window coming up. Having to be prompted for a PIN to do something as simple as a reboot, isn't a great UX. And also has UI complexities in the pre-boot environment. So? It seems to me this is a big problem for the default out of the box user experience. Edit: Ok after searching the article I can't tell how/where they sealed the key. Bitlocker tells the TPM to measure some things and if that measurement matches was in PCR12 (or whatever is defined) then reveal a secret. That secret is the bitlocker key.
- EvanAnderson 5y agoNeeding a PIN or password to boot is a tradeoff. If it's warranted by your threat model you take that tradeoff. (Personally I'd love to see the encryption and key storage module being a physically separable device that I could carry with me. Something like an HSM with I/O bandwidth sufficient to perform the bulk encryption on the device itself.)
- nuker 5y agoTPM can work without PIN requirement imho. It makes environment measurements to decide that nothing has changed. Secure boot had to be enabled too to assert that bootloader is signed.