Having trouble thinking of an example of a closed loop system that has sufficient means to prevent its own abuse. Maybe I'm way off, but the qualitative concept

Having trouble thinking of an example of a closed loop system that has sufficient means to prevent its own abuse. Maybe I'm way off, but the qualitative concept of abuse is necessarily an exogenous condition to any thing or system. The only way to reduce abuse is to reduce the domain of function of a system to where it only works with some kind of external key - and then you've just popped your abuse problem up out of the system to an encompassing logical layer where you have to manage that conceptual key problem. The basic security problem is not about whether a thing has sufficient internal rules to prevent abuse, but how a thing relates to other things, like arbitrary substrates and abstractions - security itself is a logical layer problem where you are managing a dynamic between essentially arbitrary and incompatible categories and types. I was about to argue that novel surveillance systems are not discovering anything about nature or advancing scientific knowledge, and that they are just laundering a political surveillance application through the prestige and respect of the discovery process - but that argument ignores all the amazing experimental techniques with general applications derived directly from cracking enemy codes (computers), side channel attacks (signal processing), data visualization (applications of graphs, fractal geometry), codifying and tooling applications of statistical techniques (Bayesean everything), etc. Engineering simply does not provide general solutions to the problems of abuse and oppression because it begins with the flawed assumption they are concrete problems, and not open dynamics. Instead of engineering anti-abuse rules into a system, the absolute best we can do from a security perspective is engineer costs on inputs to a system, which create incentives for its use and abuse. The rest is just adding internal complications to hide them. In this sense, Security is the study of incentives, a kind of Economics by other means. It's the analysis of systems through the lens of incentives and developing technologies that optimize for them. If security essentially reduces to a shell game or infinite three-card monte, adding arbitrary complications to systems should be seen for what it is, a qualitative distraction from the encompassing problem of whose interest prevails. I wanted to agree with Green and add that those academics he criticized for designing yet another surveillance system were not advancing science or knowledge, but I'm not sure that's the right objection. I think it's that they're just assholes.