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Isn't "Pegasus" transmitted via a well-crafted iMessage ? If only there was a central choke-point, globally, for all iMessage messages that could weed out part

by rsync 5y ago

Isn't "Pegasus" transmitted via a well-crafted iMessage ? If only there was a central choke-point, globally, for all iMessage messages that could weed out particularly ill-formed messages such that they never reach your phone ... If only ...

SheinhardtWigCo 5y ago
Because of E2EE that choke point is necessarily the software update process.
- rsync 5y ago
  Ahh... right. Thank you. Wouldn't a simple block/allow list for sending IDs / phone numbers be trivial to implement on the iCloud (or whatever) side of things such that the end user could allow their known contacts and block (everyone else) ? Forgive me - I am not an iMessage user ...
  - SheinhardtWigCo 5y ago
    Apple product marketing would never sign off on that because it would a) confuse their messaging by signaling that iMessage is less safe than email, b) hurt the user experience for the vast majority of customers.
arkadiyt 5y ago
Apple doesn't have access to the message content thanks to end-to-end encryption (technically they can have access if you backup your messages to iCloud, but by that point it's already too late). However they are working on better sandboxing to help prevent this class of attacks, and Google Project Zero posted an overview of how that "blastdoor" process works: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/01/a-look-at-imessage-in-ios-14.html https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/01/a-look-at-ime...
marderfarker2 5y ago
In the Amnesty report there were multiple attack vectors, one of which is via network hijacking which involves data mangling by network operators. Now it begs the question whether the network operators were in cahoots or this Pegasus is also capable of infecting network infrastructure.
- ASalazarMX 5y ago
  > Now it begs the question whether the network operators were in cahoots or this Pegasus is also capable of infecting network infrastructure. They can use fake cell towers, no need to escalate that far.

by rsync 5y ago

SheinhardtWigCo 5y ago

Because of E2EE that choke point is necessarily the software update process.

rsync 5y ago
Ahh... right. Thank you. Wouldn't a simple block/allow list for sending IDs / phone numbers be trivial to implement on the iCloud (or whatever) side of things such that the end user could allow their known contacts and block (everyone else) ? Forgive me - I am not an iMessage user ...
- SheinhardtWigCo 5y ago
  Apple product marketing would never sign off on that because it would a) confuse their messaging by signaling that iMessage is less safe than email, b) hurt the user experience for the vast majority of customers.

arkadiyt 5y ago

Apple doesn't have access to the message content thanks to end-to-end encryption (technically they can have access if you backup your messages to iCloud, but by that point it's already too late). However they are working on better sandboxing to help prevent this class of attacks, and Google Project Zero posted an overview of how that "blastdoor" process works: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/01/a-look-at-imessage-in-ios-14.html https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/01/a-look-at-ime...

marderfarker2 5y ago

In the Amnesty report there were multiple attack vectors, one of which is via network hijacking which involves data mangling by network operators. Now it begs the question whether the network operators were in cahoots or this Pegasus is also capable of infecting network infrastructure.

ASalazarMX 5y ago
> Now it begs the question whether the network operators were in cahoots or this Pegasus is also capable of infecting network infrastructure. They can use fake cell towers, no need to escalate that far.