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> The current standard hypothesis is that our synapse based computational network is more than sufficient to explain consciousness. This is "strong reductionis
by bencollier49 5y ago
> The current standard hypothesis is that our synapse based computational network is more than sufficient to explain consciousness.
This is "strong reductionism" which comes under the heading of "Rejection of the Problem" in the linked article. GP is essentially denying that the hard problem exists.
- wizzwizz4 5y agoTry reading that sentence with the definition of consciousness you'd normally use. It seems like you're assuming the author intended to redefine the word, but I still don't see where that redefinition took place.
- bencollier49 5y agoWhat I mean to say is that the author subscribes to a theory of consciousness "strong reductionism" which redefines it to mean "things we can observe", in as much as it states that it solves for all thing which 'need to be explained'.
- wizzwizz4 5y ago> in as much as it states that it {solves for all […]} That's as far as I can parse this bit of sentence. Could you reword, please?
- bencollier49 5y agoHere's their argument: 1. Consciousness is the activity of the brain in response to stimulae, or things that people report that they can experience. These are the only things which need to be explained. 2. We can measure these and explain them with reductive science. 3. Therefore we can explain consciousness. But of course this is a redefinition of consciousness because it ignores phenomenology. And that also needs to be explained.
- wizzwizz4 5y ago> But of course this is a redefinition of consciousness because it ignores phenomenology. No, it isn't, and it doesn't. 1. Deliberate motor movements are caused by signals from the motor cortex. 2. Poets have written poems about phenomenological experience. 3. Therefore, phenomenological experience causes activity in the brain. It's not a redefinition; just a challenge of your assumptions.