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You're redefining consciousness here to mean physical awareness in the brain, though. That is not the same thing as conscious experience. Using the physical mat
by bencollier49 5y ago
You're redefining consciousness here to mean physical awareness in the brain, though. That is not the same thing as conscious experience. Using the physical material of the brain at the electrochemical level to try to explain the hard problem of consciousness is a bit like trying to use the water cycle to explain the weak force in nuclear physics.
I'm talking here about the hard problem of consciousness: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
The only solutions which don't involve a fundamental reworking of physics basically end up denying that consciousness (as phenomenal experience) exists at all.
- wizzwizz4 5y ago> You're redefining consciousness here to mean physical awareness in the brain, though. Where?
- bencollier49 5y ago> The current standard hypothesis is that our synapse based computational network is more than sufficient to explain consciousness. This is "strong reductionism" which comes under the heading of "Rejection of the Problem" in the linked article. GP is essentially denying that the hard problem exists.
- wizzwizz4 5y agoTry reading that sentence with the definition of consciousness you'd normally use. It seems like you're assuming the author intended to redefine the word, but I still don't see where that redefinition took place.
- bencollier49 5y agoWhat I mean to say is that the author subscribes to a theory of consciousness "strong reductionism" which redefines it to mean "things we can observe", in as much as it states that it solves for all thing which 'need to be explained'.
- wizzwizz4 5y ago> in as much as it states that it {solves for all […]} That's as far as I can parse this bit of sentence. Could you reword, please?
- bencollier49 5y agoHere's their argument: 1. Consciousness is the activity of the brain in response to stimulae, or things that people report that they can experience. These are the only things which need to be explained. 2. We can measure these and explain them with reductive science. 3. Therefore we can explain consciousness. But of course this is a redefinition of consciousness because it ignores phenomenology. And that also needs to be explained.
- wizzwizz4 5y ago> But of course this is a redefinition of consciousness because it ignores phenomenology. No, it isn't, and it doesn't. 1. Deliberate motor movements are caused by signals from the motor cortex. 2. Poets have written poems about phenomenological experience. 3. Therefore, phenomenological experience causes activity in the brain. It's not a redefinition; just a challenge of your assumptions.
- ramraj07 5y agoLooks like you invented your own problem and are now claiming physics cannot explain it as it exists today. If there truly is something of “I feel it” factor that’s not just “physical” as you say it, then this can be disproven easily by seeing if a machine can attain consciousness. If that never happens then good for your theory. If it happens at some point then you’re wrong. Until then it seems like a fairly non scientific philosophical argument at best. I.e., it’s still worth having but let’s not try claiming your microtubules are tingling the quantum realm to make you think shall we?
- bencollier49 5y agoI'm afraid there's nothing special about a machine attaining consciousness. Many of the approaches to the hard problem would happily work with conscious machines. This may not be a question for science at all.