That's what I do: LUKS and a (complicated) password needed to decrypt the drive. Now TFA says it took 30 minutes and that's within the timeframe of an "evil ma

That's what I do: LUKS and a (complicated) password needed to decrypt the drive. Now TFA says it took 30 minutes and that's within the timeframe of an "evil maid attack". If we take the same 30 minutes, then it's doable to: dupe the SSD and install a physical keylogger between the laptop's keyboard and the laptop's mobo, put back the laptop in place while looking like nothing happened. Then on the next login, when the person enter his password to decrypt the SSD, have the physical keylooger emit (radio?) the password. Some may say it's science fiction but in TFA in 30 minutes they opened the laptop and hooked an analyzer to the TPM. I guess what I mean to say is: it's hard to be safe in the face of an evil maid who has 30 minutes of access to your machine.