5 ms·
The study of rare, contagious diseases seems likely enough to result in an eventual outbreak that it should be treated like enriching uranium. Which is to say,
by AbrahamParangi 5y ago
The study of rare, contagious diseases seems likely enough to result in an eventual outbreak that it should be treated like enriching uranium.
Which is to say, with great caution- and not like regular science but rather like the kind of science with potentially very negative externalities.
- gonzo41 5y agoWelcome to the exciting world of duel use microbiology research. There's plenty of people are doing stuff that walks the line between learning new things and creating ways to weaponize germs. It's all a question of good governance.
- choeger 5y ago> duel use microbiology research This typo demands an xkcd!
- marcellus23 5y agono it doesn't.
- Voloskaya 5y agoCJD isn't contagious, unless you start eating the brain of your friends.
- AbrahamParangi 5y agoYes, it doesn’t seem like an immediate risk but I am making a more general point.
- missedthecue 5y agothis is a nitpick, but "negative externality" isn't a synonym for "bad things happening". It describes a market transaction which inherently imposes costs on an unrelated third party. For instance, a steel mill producing rolling stock to sell me releases sulfur into the air that dirties your property, imposing a cost on you. Prion research doesn't necessarily impose costs on anyone.
- zzbzq 5y agoIt's not a nitpick, it's just wrong. Bad things happening is a cost which is both negative and external. The use of the term "negative externality" works here.
- missedthecue 5y agoNegative externality is an economic term which describes a specific market failure. A research lab leak (or nuclear meltdown, or whatever) is a rare accident, not a negative externality. It would be like me saying the theory of relativity just means a theory about how everything is relative. That's obviously wrong. You can't just break down academic terms into their separate words. It doesn't make sense.
- jjk166 5y agoThird parties suffering a disease is the negative externality. There's no difference between a steel mill leaking sulphur in the course of producing steel and a biotech company releasing prions in the course of producing medicines. Radiation leaks in the course of producing electricity are likewise externalities.
- missedthecue 5y agoYes, there is a main difference which changes the entire definition. Sulfur emissions are a core part of steel production. You cannot manufacture steel without using carbon in the reduction process. It is inherent. However, you CAN research diseases without having accidental lab leaks. Thousands of labs around the world do this perfectly fine year in, year out. That's the way it's normally done. The process of researching diseases does not inherently impose costs on anyone else.
- jjk166 5y agoNo, sulfur release is not a core part of steel production, and indeed sulphur emmision has been drastically reduced since regulations made steel producers bear the cost of sulphur emmissions, removing it as an externality. Labs don't continuously spew out diseases, but they very much must impose the risk of such releases upon others. That is the cost. It costs money to insure against risk, even if the disaster never comes to pass. If a biotech company reduces its costs by implementing looser safety policies thus increasing risk to the surrounding population, that cost is borne externally. Hence the name.
- harles 5y agoKnown prions can’t cause an outbreak without extraordinary methods of spread, such as cannibalism.
- XorNot 5y agoAlso no terrorist is interested in a weapon which takes 10 years to kill their target population, maybe. The threat of WMD terror hasn't materialized in a meaningful way: intact, state-manufactured nuclear weapons are the only plausible weapons non-state actors can realistically handle without killing themselves with them, and even that's pretty questionable: it's not easy to detonate a nuclear bomb. Chemicals are even worse: it's pretty easy for a chemistry student to accidentally make organophosphates, but terror groups don't try in any substantial way - you're as likely to poison yourself as anyone else. Biologicals are the worst: screw up and they infect you and then the rest of your organisation - or you have a power cut and everything dies in the test tube.
- meowface 5y ago>Also no terrorist is interested in a weapon which takes 10 years to kill their target population, maybe. Not necessarily. If you can somehow pull off a food supply chain attack which creates the perception that a lot of food may have been contaminated with prions, that could potentially very effectively induce a state of mass terror. Symptoms take years to manifest; can't be fully diagnosed until you're already dead; inevitably fatal. It could potentially turn half of a country into (somewhat rational) hypochondriacs, even if almost no one actually became infected. And if it were confirmed that a lot of people were infected, that'd ramp up the fear much more. Also, the cost of pulling it off is probably much lower than the cost of detonating a dirty bomb or even a full nuclear bomb, while potentially achieving a much stronger effect. >The threat of WMD terror hasn't materialized in a meaningful way: intact, state-manufactured nuclear weapons are the only plausible weapons non-state actors can realistically handle without killing themselves with them, and even that's pretty questionable: it's not easy to detonate a nuclear bomb. I kind of disagree. Nuclear weapons seem like they probably won't be viable for terrorism for a very long time, if ever, but I don't think they're the only plausible weapons that can realistically be handled. Look at Aum Shinrikyo and their various planned, attempted, and successful chemical and biological attacks in the 90s. They killed 27 and injured over 6,000 people, but they came very close to potentially killing or debilitating tens of thousands. There's definitely a risk of being injured or dying in the process, but they took (largely effective) precautions to prevent that. You can also do things like use binary agents which only activate when combined. But, perhaps most importantly, terrorists (regardless of motive/ideology) often fully accept and welcome that they may be harmed or killed in the process, so the risk isn't a big deterrent. I suspect that within this century, at least one terrorist/cult/lone wolf chemical and/or biological attack is going to come close to, or succeed at, killing a large number of people, and I think the threat of future attacks may paralyze a lot of societies.
- spfzero 5y agoIt's more dangerous than enriching Uranium. Uranium does not self-replicate, for one thing. It's also very easy to detect and ensure it has stayed contained.