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> The greatest danger to national security has become the companies that claim to protect it No. The greatest danger is lack of software supply chain managemen
by bob1029 5y ago
> The greatest danger to national security has become the companies that claim to protect it
No. The greatest danger is lack of software supply chain management followed by near-universal disrespect for formal complexity management methods.
The only way I have found to win at this "are we actually secure" game is to minimize the number of parties you have to trust. The smaller you get this figure, the easier it becomes to gain control over your circumstances again. How many of us can immediately state the exact number of unique parties that we have to trust as part of building solutions for other people?
What about complexity? Most of the time, something is insecure not because of malicious intent (covered by the trust angle above), but because its so goddamn complex that no one can say for sure if its correct or not. Why do we tolerate this?
- ncmncm 5y agoThere is no supply-chain accountability without liability. When adding a dependency, knowing it exposes you to prosecution if it becomes a vector for security violation would give pause. A premium on attested-secure components might develop. If Facebook depended on Zst being secure to be able to stay in business, we might be more inclined to use Zst than e.g. unmaintained Zlib.
- ryandrake 5y agoComing from embedded/avionics, it's shocking how careless and cavalier the rest of the development industry is about their dependencies. At most places, outside large FAANGs that bake external dependency reviews into their process, the process is: 1. Developer has a problem to solve 2. Developer does a few web searches and finds libXyz, which looks like it solves the problem. 3. Developer tries libXyz and it solves the problem. 4. Yolo! A libXyz dependency is added, and now it's part of the product that the company stakes its name and reputation on. Total madness. What else does libXyz do? What data does it collect? What does it do with that data? What bugs does libXyz have, and do they put our product at risk? What about security risks? Does libXyz have tests, and do they pass? How extensive is its test coverage, and would that be sufficient at our company? Does libXyz impact the overall performance of our product? What is its maximum memory footprint? Does libXyz limit our product to a particular architecture? What is libXyz's license, and is it compatible with our product? Who is responsible if libXyz fails and our company gets sued? You're lucky if the developer even thinks about one or two of these, let alone fully auditing the library. Staking your product on the suitability of a library but not actually thoroughly vetting the library. And some products out there have hundreds of dependencies, all added in the manner described above. We're just handing out loaded guns.
- bob1029 5y ago> A premium on attested-secure components might develop Isn't this effectively the Microsoft/IBM/Oracle ecosystem play?
- ncmncm 5y agoThe difference is that they purport to sell you assurance (and lie), where aping FB would leave you no more exposed than deep-pockets (therefore attractive-target) FB.