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I'm really interested in instructions which would enable storage encryption key to be stored in the TPM so Linux could have the similar user friendly flow as Ma

I'm really interested in instructions which would enable storage encryption key to be stored in the TPM so Linux could have the similar user friendly flow as MacOS and Windows with Bitlocker has - boot up computer, storage is decrypted automatically so user only needs to know username and password. If storage is removed from computer or booted from "untrusted source", storage stays "locked". Backup key, for recovery purposes, needs to be stored in a password vault/physical safe/some external system. The same as it is with MacOS Filevault/Microsoft Windows Bitlocker.

zer0-c00l 5y ago
This exists. https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Trusted_Platform_Module#Data-at-rest_encryption_with_LUKS https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Trusted_Platform_Module#Dat...
WhyNotHugo 5y ago
Honestly, I think providing the disk decryption password during early boot is a lot safer. If the TPM yields the decryption key, then the disk is mounted without the user being present, so any RUNTIME security hole can be exploited by the attacker (e.g.: USB exploits, etc). The Mac/Windows model just seems less-safe (though more friendly for shared devices). I would like a shared system though: where I provide half the key, and the TPM has the other half, so BOTH are necessary to decrypt the disk.
- michaelt 5y ago
  Just keying in the password at boot is indeed more secure than using a TPM, when it comes to the threat of someone snatching your powered-off laptop. But if you want full disk encryption for a server without the need to attend it in person to enter the password every time it restarts, you might feel the middling security a TPM provides is an improvement over not encrypting the disk at all. Or if you issue a big fleet of laptops to forgetful users, and remote password reset is a must-have feature, the TPM is more secure than the user writing the password on a post-it note stuck to the laptop. Or if you're making something like a TiVo where you want it to work without a password - while also locking down the device, even against the owner. So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation!
  - nuker 5y ago
    > But if you want full disk encryption for a server without the need to attend it in person to enter the password every time it restarts … So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation! Also great for personal NAS for example. But its bloody hard to implement on Linux/BSD at the moment
  - WhyNotHugo 5y ago
    > So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation! Quite true. They're pretty bad if you're just a person.
- invokestatic 5y ago
  Windows supports TPM+PIN which is what you describe.
rythie 5y ago
You so that with clevis: https://kowalski7cc.xyz/blog/luks2-tpm2-clevis-fedora31 https://kowalski7cc.xyz/blog/luks2-tpm2-clevis-fedora31 You can also unlock using a tang server: https://www.networkshinobi.com/clevis-and-tang-network-bound-disk-encryption/ https://www.networkshinobi.com/clevis-and-tang-network-bound...

zer0-c00l 5y ago

This exists. https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Trusted_Platform_Module#Data-at-rest_encryption_with_LUKS https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Trusted_Platform_Module#Dat...

WhyNotHugo 5y ago

Honestly, I think providing the disk decryption password during early boot is a lot safer. If the TPM yields the decryption key, then the disk is mounted without the user being present, so any RUNTIME security hole can be exploited by the attacker (e.g.: USB exploits, etc). The Mac/Windows model just seems less-safe (though more friendly for shared devices). I would like a shared system though: where I provide half the key, and the TPM has the other half, so BOTH are necessary to decrypt the disk.

michaelt 5y ago
Just keying in the password at boot is indeed more secure than using a TPM, when it comes to the threat of someone snatching your powered-off laptop. But if you want full disk encryption for a server without the need to attend it in person to enter the password every time it restarts, you might feel the middling security a TPM provides is an improvement over not encrypting the disk at all. Or if you issue a big fleet of laptops to forgetful users, and remote password reset is a must-have feature, the TPM is more secure than the user writing the password on a post-it note stuck to the laptop. Or if you're making something like a TiVo where you want it to work without a password - while also locking down the device, even against the owner. So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation!
- nuker 5y ago
  > But if you want full disk encryption for a server without the need to attend it in person to enter the password every time it restarts … So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation! Also great for personal NAS for example. But its bloody hard to implement on Linux/BSD at the moment
- WhyNotHugo 5y ago
  > So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation! Quite true. They're pretty bad if you're just a person.
invokestatic 5y ago
Windows supports TPM+PIN which is what you describe.

rythie 5y ago

You so that with clevis: https://kowalski7cc.xyz/blog/luks2-tpm2-clevis-fedora31 https://kowalski7cc.xyz/blog/luks2-tpm2-clevis-fedora31 You can also unlock using a tang server: https://www.networkshinobi.com/clevis-and-tang-network-bound-disk-encryption/ https://www.networkshinobi.com/clevis-and-tang-network-bound...