On the contrary, every study I know of shows substantial bias towards the corporate side in these sorts of disputes. That's why they're attractive to the corpor

On the contrary, every study I know of shows substantial bias towards the corporate side in these sorts of disputes. That's why they're attractive to the corporation in the first place. This link explains how even a "fair" system (arbitrator chosen from a random list) is gamed: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/why-binding-arbitration-game-rigged-against-customers https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/why-binding-arbitratio... It's simple. The optimum situation from Amazon's point of view is a system that gives almost enough justice to avoid public outcry, and no more. The most outrageous cases should get paid a modest amount, average cases should get paid a tiny amount, and no stretch cases should get paid. Amazon anticipated that by paying for the arbitration process, they'd end up with a set of pro-Amazon arbitrators and that, in itself, would keep the number of cases filed to a minimum. What they didn't anticipate was enough people angry enough to file cases even in a biased system just to mess with the company.