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Hrmm. Sounds like the misguided Shuttle program is like a lot of popular web technologies and protocols (better alternatives out there, people doing busy work f

by e03179 15y ago

Hrmm. Sounds like the misguided Shuttle program is like a lot of popular web technologies and protocols (better alternatives out there, people doing busy work for years on end, concern of security, etc.).

InclinedPlane 15y ago
The Shuttle is a fairly classic example of "2nd system syndrome". It was designed to replace every single launch vehicle currently in existence and to become the backbone of manned spaceflight, cargo launches, and military spaceflight. Large payloads were to be assembled in orbit in pieces (a la ISS). Comsats and suchlike were to be launched in the cargo bay far cheaper than any expendable rocket could manage. Military missions were to be conducted with very little prep-time from Vandenberg AFB with polar missions that would fly over Western Russia (Moscow, Leningrad, etc.) and then return in one orbit back to the launch site. Since the Earth would have rotated under the Shuttle's orbit this would require an immense cross-range flight capability (about a thousand miles), this requirement forced the orbiters to have exceptionally large wings and thus a stronger airframe to support them and a more extensive re-entry shielding, both of which significantly increased the dry weight of the vehicle as well as the total area of extremely vulnerable thermal protection systems (such as the much larger wing leading edge carbon-carbon shielding, which led to the disintegration of Columbia on re-entry when it was damaged by iced foam during takeoff). That cross-range flight capability was never used in practice as polar military missions from Vandenberg never came about, though the requirement imposed a heavy burden on the Shuttle's capabilities and costs. The Shuttle was also designed to haul an airlock, rendezvous equipment, and a robotic arm, even though such capabilities are not necessary for every mission, though again the requirements affect the capabilities and cost of every mission. On paper each orbiter was to have flow dozens of times a year, this was a key element of lowering launch costs. In practice the orbiters were not truly reusable and were more refurbishable, the main engines were replaced on each flight, all of the consumables were flushed, the cargo bay liner was removed and replaced, the tile-based thermal shield had to be extensively inspected, etc. in a months long process that steeply limited the flight rate of the orbiters and vastly increased launch costs (ultimately making the Shuttle one of the most expensive launch vehicles of all time). Overall the Shuttles tried to satisfy too many mission requirements and ultimately did not achieve any of them well. And in the process a hugely compromised system which was vastly more expensive and vastly less capable than previous systems was built.

by e03179 15y ago

InclinedPlane 15y ago

The Shuttle is a fairly classic example of "2nd system syndrome". It was designed to replace every single launch vehicle currently in existence and to become the backbone of manned spaceflight, cargo launches, and military spaceflight. Large payloads were to be assembled in orbit in pieces (a la ISS). Comsats and suchlike were to be launched in the cargo bay far cheaper than any expendable rocket could manage. Military missions were to be conducted with very little prep-time from Vandenberg AFB with polar missions that would fly over Western Russia (Moscow, Leningrad, etc.) and then return in one orbit back to the launch site. Since the Earth would have rotated under the Shuttle's orbit this would require an immense cross-range flight capability (about a thousand miles), this requirement forced the orbiters to have exceptionally large wings and thus a stronger airframe to support them and a more extensive re-entry shielding, both of which significantly increased the dry weight of the vehicle as well as the total area of extremely vulnerable thermal protection systems (such as the much larger wing leading edge carbon-carbon shielding, which led to the disintegration of Columbia on re-entry when it was damaged by iced foam during takeoff). That cross-range flight capability was never used in practice as polar military missions from Vandenberg never came about, though the requirement imposed a heavy burden on the Shuttle's capabilities and costs. The Shuttle was also designed to haul an airlock, rendezvous equipment, and a robotic arm, even though such capabilities are not necessary for every mission, though again the requirements affect the capabilities and cost of every mission. On paper each orbiter was to have flow dozens of times a year, this was a key element of lowering launch costs. In practice the orbiters were not truly reusable and were more refurbishable, the main engines were replaced on each flight, all of the consumables were flushed, the cargo bay liner was removed and replaced, the tile-based thermal shield had to be extensively inspected, etc. in a months long process that steeply limited the flight rate of the orbiters and vastly increased launch costs (ultimately making the Shuttle one of the most expensive launch vehicles of all time). Overall the Shuttles tried to satisfy too many mission requirements and ultimately did not achieve any of them well. And in the process a hugely compromised system which was vastly more expensive and vastly less capable than previous systems was built.