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The simulation hypothesis is very intriguing, but one thing that is almost always overlooked about the simulation hypothesis is its premises. I reject the very
by Lichtso 5y ago
The simulation hypothesis is very intriguing, but one thing that is almost always overlooked about the simulation hypothesis is its premises.
I reject the very foundation of the simulation hypothesis: That worlds (can) exist inside other worlds. "Inside" can mean geometrically (physically inside) or topologically (element in a set). That would mean that the "inside" relation is a hierarchy / tree with a root (a true reality). Instead I think of it as a graph, where worlds can observe each other, without any influence on one another, thus there is no need for an origin or root.
Thought experiment: For the sake of simplicity let's say that our world is the game of chess (but the argument can be done for any universe with a set of rules, including ours). The simulation hypothesis would argue that a session of chess is a world and that playing that session on a physical board is a simulation. Furthermore, it would claim that this world exists while it is simulated on the board, by being played. Kicking the board over, ending the simulation would also end the simulated world.
Now, there are many logical inconsistencies here, uncovered by the following questions:
- What if I replicate the simulation by playing exactly the same session on a second board? There is only one session but now it has two hosts!? Which one does it exist "in"?
- How can I claim that I ended a simulated world, when I can't be sure that nobody else is simulating it somewhere else too?
- How can I claim to have done a new unique simulation if somebody else might have already done exactly the same in the past?
The main issue I have is that the simulation hypothesis thinks of simulations as imperative: That the simulation host does invent, change, influence, manipulate, guide the simulated world. I prefer to think of it as functional, it observes where a particular path (which exists regardless) leads without changing the outcome. Thus performing an action on the host merely turns your telescope a bit, so that you now observe a different route but the night sky exists immutably with or without you observing it.
- Tenoke 5y ago>Now, there are many logical inconsistencies here, uncovered by the following questions: - What if I replicate the simulation by playing exactly the same session on a second board? There is only one session but now it has two hosts!? Which one does it exist "in"? - How can I claim that I ended a simulated world, when I can't be sure that nobody else is simulating it somewhere else too? - How can I claim to have done a new unique simulation if somebody else might have already done exactly the same in the past? I dont know why you think that's a gotcha. If I copy the solar system down to the last atom including you and put the copy in another part of the universe, do you suddenly not exist because there's an exact copy of you running elsewhere?
- Lichtso 5y agoThe other way around: It shows that I always exists, independent of the number of observing copies (even if it is 0). Basically: There are only weak pointers and no strong pointer, yet it never gets deallocated or was ever allocated to begin with.
- Tenoke 5y agoI see. Under something like MUH it wouldn't matter, yes. But then nothing matters under MUH anyway.
- geon 5y agoJust how like turning a telescope does not affect the reality of the night sky, you thinking about the world differently does not affect the reality, simulated or not.
- Lichtso 5y agoTrue, I simply use this argument to show that there is nothing to worry about, not to prove anything about our reality. The simulation hypothesis is often connected with fears like: Are our gods benevolent, what if they abandon us or pull the plug? And my answer is: Why care, they can't "do" anything to us. If they change their simulation they simply observe something else, not us anymore, and we stay where & who we are.
- virgil_disgr4ce 5y ago> What if I replicate the simulation by playing exactly the same session on a second board? ...then you have two simulations...? How is this a "logical inconsistency?" Your post is confusing to me—I couldn't detect any actual objections or issues with the simulation hypothesis in it.
- Lichtso 5y agoOk, but which of the two is the true one? What is the root of the tree / hierarch of realities now? You got a diamond topology (like in multiple inheritance) and that is not compatible with a tree, thus inconsistent.
- PeterisP 5y agoIf they are just two copies - i.e. they happen to be identical if they're "copied properly" but there's no causal relationship where one continuously mirrors or copies attributes, behavior or outcomes of the other - then they're just two separate leaves from the "branch" that's running the simulation, there's no diamond topology. And, of course, they might diverge for various reasons (inherent randomness or intentional tweaks in one of the simulations) at arbitrary time, reinforcing the idea that there's not one entity in two simulations but two separate entities, even if they happen to be identical at the moment, no matter if you run simulations in parallel or sequentially. In such cases, the question of "which is the true one" is really empty, there's no meaningful notion of trueness, all instances of a similar entity are equally valid. If we'd be making copies of sentient entities, then perhaps we might want to define some distinction to privilege one of the copies over the other (e.g. in mind uploading the physical/original entity over the upload), but if the simulations are equivalent then that distinction between copies/instances is just arbitrary and all of them essentially are just as valid.
- Lichtso 5y ago> they happen to be identical > Entities in each simulation are separate instances, no matter if you run simulations in parallel or sequentially Things can't "happen" to be identical, they are (one). E.g. I write the concept of the number 3 in a hundred different languages, fonts and styles. They are all the same, only their hosting representations are many. I think our disagreement boils down to whether you accept or reject this. > "which is the true one" is really empty, there's no meaningful notion of trueness > simulations are equivalent, then that distinction is just arbitrary Exactly, so you agree?